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AbstRAct
This report – representing one of three case studies that are part of a transat-
lantic research project aimed at exploring the potential relation between ICT 
Interoperability and eInnovation – examines issues surrounding DRM inter-
operability within the context of music content.  Recognizing that interoper-
ability will likely be defined differently by different stakeholders, we begin by 
establishing a rough, holistic working definition of interoperability and then 
assess the implementation of DRM in the music content market and associ-
ated problems with regard to interoperability.  We then go on to explore the 
technological, market, and legal environments in their relation to and impact 
upon the achievement of interoperable DRM systems.  In part 2, we analyze 
potential benefits and drawbacks of an interoperable DRM environment for 
the music content market.  We then evaluate both private and public-initiat-
ed approaches towards the accomplishment of interoperability using a series 
of qualitative benchmarks.  Lastly, we conclude by summing up the merits 
and demerits of the various approaches.  Our findings lead us to surmise that 
normative considerations weigh in favor of greater interoperability in gen-
eral. The challenge of determining the optimal level of interoperability and 
the best approach for attaining it, however, points toward consideration of a 
number of complex factors.  We conclude that the best way to determine the 
optimal level of interoperability and means of accomplishing it is to rely upon 
economic-based assessments on a case-by-case basis.iii t a b l e  o f  c o n t e n t s
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About thIs RePoRt
This report represents one of three larger case studies on interoperability in 
information and communication technologies (ICT) as part of a transatlantic 
research initiative between the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at 
Harvard Law School and the Research Center for Information Law at the 
University of St. Gallen (Switzerland). The research initiative, supported by 
Microsoft, Inc., seeks to address four core questions: First, what is an ap-
propriate understanding of “interoperability” in important areas of digital 
technology? Second, is there a positive relationship between higher levels of 
interoperability in ICTs and innovation beyond anecdotal evidence, ground-
ed in focused analytical work? Third, what are possible approaches to achieve 
ICT interoperability, ranging from IP licensing to open standards, and what 
are their respective benefits and drawbacks? Fourth, based on the answers to 
the first three questions, what conclusions can be drawn for policymakers and 
other stakeholders when it comes to ICT interoperability? Naturally, differ-
ent research designs could be used to explore these questions. The principal 
investigators of the present research initiative decided to answer the four core 
questions in concrete rather than abstract terms by working with three larger, 
exploratory case studies from which more general conclusions – in the sense 
of “lessons learned” – might be drawn. This report summarizes the findings 
with regard to the case study on DRM-protected Music Interoperability and 
should be read against the backdrop of the four larger research questions pre-
viously mentioned. Consequently, this study does not aim to discuss DRM in 
general nor does it seek to provide a comprehensive discussion of interoper-
ability as such. Rather, we have chosen to examine DRM-protected music 
due to its value as a significant microcosm within the digital environment 
from which beneficial insights might be gained with regard to the guiding 
research interest behind this project.
The design of the research initiative, which has produced a series of publica-
tions including a Policy White Paper, is certainly shaped by the investigators’ 
underlying attitudes towards interoperability which can be summarized as 
follows: Like many observers of the ICT space, the authors of this study are 
inclined to think that interoperability in the ICT space (as elsewhere) is desir-
able. As a policy matter, the contributors to this report believe that innova-
tion, consumer choice, and competition are sound policy goals. To the extent c a s e s t u d y   DRM-protected Music Interoperability and eInnovation vi
that some forms of interoperability are likely to contribute to these ends, the 
authors will argue that interoperability should be promoted. Much of the ex-
ercise undertaken in this report, however, is to adopt a skeptical stance toward 
these positions and to ascertain whether the evidence supports them.1 i n t r o d u c t i o n
IntRoDuctIon
Françoise M. bought Alain Souchon’s “J’veux du Live,” a CD distributed by 
EMI France. The CD played on her home entertainment system, but not on 
the CD player in her Renault Clio. As it turned out, the copy protection scheme 
on the CD rendered it impossible to play the CD on certain devices, including 
car radios. Françoise M. and a French consumer protection organization filed 
a lawsuit against EMI with the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Nanterre. That 
court ruled that a CD that could not be played on all players restricts consum-
ers and must therefore be considered a defective product. Accordingly, the 
court held that the music fan had the right to get her money back.
In summer 2004, RealNetworks added a new feature called “Harmony” to 
its RealPlayer. Harmony allowed users of the RealPlayer Music Store to play 
their songs on iPods from Apple. This action on the part of RealNetworks 
frustrated  Apple’s  music  protection  scheme,  FairPlay,  that,  among  other 
things, prevents songs bought from other online music stores to be played 
on an iPod. In response, Apple threatened (but did not file) a lawsuit against 
RealNeworks and soon upgraded its software to disable RealPlayer’s convert-
ing functionality. 
The two examples in the preceding paragraphs – taken from the perspective of 
a consumer and competitor respectively – tell stories about the use of a certain 
type of technology known as digital rights management (DRM) systems. In 
the digital media realm, such systems are used by right-holders to control the 
access to and use of music or other forms of digital content. DRM technol-
ogy essentially allows right-holders to set and enforce rules about what users 
can and cannot do with digital content distributed either over the Internet or 
on physical media such as CDs or DVDs. The initial rationale for DRM was 
mainly to stop large-scale copyright infringement over peer-to-peer networks. 
More recently, however, alternative justifications such as price-discrimination 
and platform innovation have been identified.1
1   See Ed Felten, DRM Wars: the Next Generation, http://www.freedom-to-tinker.
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Traditional DRM schemes regulate the interoperation between digital prod-
ucts and services.2 In order to serve its purposes (most importantly, to regulate 
access to digital content and its redistribution, but also to allow price dis-
crimination, depending on the particular business model), it is deliberately 
designed to create a certain degree of incompatibility. Depending on the per-
spective and context, the resulting level of interoperability may be perceived 
as a positive or negative result. In the case of Françoise M., it is rather straight-
forward that the lack of interoperability led to a negative consumer experi-
ence. In the second example, the lack of interoperability between competing 
online music stores and players is clearly intended by Apple, which uses DRM 
to create a strong tie between its popular portable music player (iPod) and the 
iTunes Store. Viewed from the competitor’s perspective, in contrast, a certain 
degree of interoperability between an alternative online music service and 
Apple’s iPod would be desirable, as Real’s Harmony illustrates.
This paper addresses the issue of DRM music interoperability in greater de-
tail. The first part of the case study starts with a brief working definition of 
DRM interoperability and provides an overview of the current state of play of 
DRM-protected music. The emphasis of this section is on the degree of DRM 
interoperability that characterizes online music distribution. We then identify 
key factors and forces that affect the current level of interoperability in the 
DRM ecosystem. In this context, we also explore the divergent and often 
dynamic incentive structures among different players and their effects on the 
development and proliferation of interoperable DRM systems. The second 
part of the paper discusses possible benefits and drawbacks of DRM interop-
erability, thereby focusing on the relationship between DRM interoperability 
and innovation. Finally, in part three, we map and assess different approaches 
towards DRM interoperability, including market-based approaches and pos-
sible governmental interventions, according to specified benchmarks. Part 
four summarizes and concludes that a blended private-sector approach with 
secondary, reinforcing actions by regulators is likely to be the most promising 
strategy towards increasing and sustainable DRM interoperability.
2   Ed Felten, DRM Wars: Property Rights Management, http://www.freedom-to-tinker.
com/?p=1052. 3 i n t r o d u c t i o nc a s e s t u d y   DRM-protected Music Interoperability and eInnovation 4
stAte of PlAy:  1
DRM MusIc 
InteRoPeRAbIlIty 
What is dRM Interoperability? 1.1 
The definitions and interpretations of the term “DRM interoperability” are 
manifold and heterogeneous. The EU High Level Group on Digital Rights 
Management, for example, defines the term as follows:
In the context of DRM the term interoperability encompasses consist-
ent functioning of the overall system including security and access, such 
that the system is able “mutually to use” information in the form of us-
age rules, content and technical measures “in all the ways in which they 
are intended to function”. This would apply even when content from 
different interoperable services is used and when such content is used 
on different interoperable devices. For the consumer, interoperability 
means he can choose different devices and use them with different serv-
ices. For the content producer or content aggregator interoperability 
means he is not locked in to one distribution channel that forms a 
gatekeeper to the marketplace. For the device and ICT developer, inter-
operability means that his products can be used with different content 
services – and that a gatekeeper does not form around a specific DRM 
technology.3
3   High Level Group on Digital Rights Management, Final Report, March-July 2004, p. 
9-10, available at http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/2005/all_about/dig-
ital_rights_man/doc/040709_hlg_drm_2nd_meeting_final_report.pdf..
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Heileman and Jamkhedkar, to take an example from the scholarly literature 
on the subject, discuss the term DRM interoperability in their survey paper 
as follows:
It seems that everyone has a notion of what interoperability means, 
which generally revolves around the idea of “things” working together. 
A slightly more formal definition related to technology is: “The abil-
ity of one technology to interact with another technology in order to 
implement some useful functionality”. It is possible to make nearly any 
two DRM technologies work together in a manner that satisfies this 
definition. Specifically, by building translation services, it is often pos-
sible to make one DRM regime work with a different DRM regime. 
At the current stage of development of DRM markets, this approach 
to interoperability makes sense. … However, in order to facilitate the 
continued development of DRM markets, more detailed notions of in-
teroperability of DRM technologies must be developed. In this sense, 
the real issue is not interoperability per se, but rather the level of inter-
operability that allows better DRM solutions to be created.4
Koenen et al., for instance, flesh out the concept of DRM interoperability by 
distinguishing among three types of interoperability:
Full format interoperability expects that the interchange representation 
of the digital content can be consistently processed based on agreement 
between all participants in the value chain. … Full format interoper-
ability usually entails robustness criteria and a certification regime to 
establish trustworthiness and security of conformant implementations. 
…
Connected interoperability builds on the expectation that consumers 
will have online access, and relies upon online services, some of them 
possibly transformative or capable of complex negotiation, to solve in-
teroperability problems in a transparent way. While different parties 
may do things in different ways, translations or bridges exist between 
the ways different parties perform DRM functions, and that mutually 
trusted parties can perform these translations transparently, as long as 
devices are connected at least some of the time. …
Configuration-driven interoperability assumes that system components 
(“tools”, possibly from different vendors) can be downloaded and/or 
configured in real-time at e.g. the consumer’s device or software applica-
tion. This allows consumer systems to effectively “acquire” functionality 
on demand in order to accommodate new formats, protocols, and so 
on….5
4  Gregory L. Heileman and Pramod A. Jamkhedkar, DRM Interoperability Analysis from 
the Perspective of a Layered Framework, in: Proceedings of the Fifth ACM Workshop on 
Digital Rights Management, 17-26, Alexandria, Nov. 2005, p. 20.
5   Rob H. Koenen, Jack Lacy, Michael MacKay, and Steve Mitchell, The Long March to 
Interoperable Digital Rights Management, p. 10 et seq. 2003 (manuscript on file with Urs 
Gasser), Proceedings of the IEEE, 92(6):883–897, 2004.c a s e s t u d y   DRM-protected Music Interoperability and eInnovation 6
The few examples provided in the previous paragraph illustrate the diversity of 
approaches aimed at defining and conceptualizing the term “DRM interop-
erability.” An extensive review of various proposals confirms that a common 
definition of the concept has not emerged. Arguably, the difficulty to agree on 
a common definition has to do with the multi-layered architecture of DRM 
schemes and their interactions with components such as hardware, software, 
and data. In order to be useful in the context of this policy paper, a working 
definition of DRM interoperability should share a number of characteristics. 
First, it is important that the definition is broad enough to embrace both pro-
cess and architecture-oriented concepts of DRM interoperability.6 Second, 
and related to the first aspect, the working definition should not predeter-
mine the ways in which a desired level of interoperability must be achieved. In 
fact, we will examine rather distinct approaches to achieve interoperability in 
a later part of this paper, and all approaches to DRM interoperability should 
fit under the working definition. Third, interoperability as a concept is not a 
binary characteristic: different degrees of interoperability exist along a spec-
trum.7 Fourth, interoperability is often context-specific: In different circum-
stances it means different things to different stakeholders (such as consumers/
users, vendors, right-holders, etc.).
Against this backdrop, we use the term DRM interoperability not in the nar-
row, nor in the strictly technical sense, but as the perceived notion of proper 
functioning of the relevant elements of two or more entities that facilitates 
access to and use of digital content. Often, of course, the content is digital 
entertainment goods, but not always.  At the core of this definition is the 
relative ability of different systems, applications, or components – usually 
provided by multiple vendors – to work together in a way that is satisfactory 
to the relevant users of the system, application, or component. 
6   Process-oriented concepts of DRM interoperability focus on use-cases and the role of 
different actors (such as creators, distributors, purchasers, etc.) with a view to the im-
plementation of specific DRM functionalities; architecture-oriented concepts distinguish 
different layers of a DRM system regarding the types of services that should be provided 
within each layer and focus on interactions between these layers (see Heileman and 
Jamkhedkar, supra note 4, p.  17-18; see also infra n 15).
7   See, e.g., L. Jean Camp, Trust and Risk in Internet Commerce, Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2000, p. 176; John Palfrey, Holding Out for an Interoperable DRM Standard, in : Digital 
rights management. 1-26. Bern, 2005, p. 13-14 .7 c h a p t e r  o n e   state of Play: DRM-protected Music Interoperability
A relatively high degree of DRM interoperability according to this definition 
would mean different things to different stakeholders, for example:
DRM interoperability from the user’s perspective means that she can  •	
flexibly choose among different services that offer DRM-protected con-
tent, which in turn can be used with different applications or on different 
devices. 
From the angle of a content provider, DRM interoperability means that  •	
content and rights can be “cleared” once and distributed over the most 
efficient distribution channel, without being locked into a gatekeeper-
like distribution channel.
From the content distributor’s perspective, DRM interoperability ensures  •	
that its technology choice doesn’t affect the utility of its service to users, 
as the delivered content might be played by any application and device. 
Interoperability for the vendor means that her products work with dif- •	
ferent services, or (more generally) that one system’s component can be 
replaced by a component from another vendor. 
In the next section, we will briefly analyze to what extent the current DRM 
music ecosystem is – or is not – characterized by high degrees of interoper-
ability. 
dRM Interoperability and Music distribution 1.2 
Offline	distribution 1.2.1 
In November 2005, Sony BMG Music Entertainment announced that it had 
instructed retailers to remove any unsold audio CDs that were copy-protected 
by so-called “rootkit” software from their shelves. This recall followed after 
an intense public controversy concerning Sony BMG’s integration of a copy 
protection measure on CDs representing over 100 titles. The copy protec-
tion involved software that automatically installed on a consumer’s computer 
(after she accepted the EULA) when she tried to play the CD, making the 
computer vulnerable to virus attacks, worms, and other forms of malware. A 
number of lawsuits, including class actions in New York and California, were 
filed and later settled. 
At the root of the Sony BMG rootkit story is the right-holders’ attempt to 
protect copyrighted music distributed on CDs by technological means. While c a s e s t u d y   DRM-protected Music Interoperability and eInnovation 8
CDs were initially sold without any DRM protection schemes in place, in 
2002 and 2003 the industry started to implement copy control technologies 
on CDs as a response to the widespread availability of CD burners, which en-
abled users to copy digital sound recordings onto blank CDs at low marginal 
costs and with excellent quality. 
The Sony BMG rootkit example and the above-mentioned story of Fran-
çoise M. illustrate that copy control technology on CDs has had a series of 
(occasionally unintended) consequences. First, because many protected CDs 
departed from the published standards for CD Audio, they did not work on 
certain devices such as DVD players, CD-ROM drives, portable players, and 
car CD players, causing a type of interoperability problem that was previously 
unknown. Second, some copy-protected CDs – as in the case of Sony BMG 
rootkit – interfered with a computer’s proper functioning by causing system 
crashes and creating security risks for these PCs. Third, the copy controls 
prevented users not only from making illegal copies but also from exercis-
ing traditional fair use rights, even though it did allow them to make a few 
backup CD-R copies and transfer the music to MP3 players using Microsoft 
or Sony DRM.
Facing interoperability problems, security risks, legal risk exposure, and con-
sumer complaints, the right-holders started reconsidering the use of copy-
protection schemes on CDs, and major labels, including EMI, recently an-
nounced that they would abstain from using such technology on CDs in 
certain markets (especially in the U.S. and UK).8 In other parts of the world, 
however, copy-protection technology on CDs is still employed, arguably re-
sulting in a CD music ecosystem with limited interoperability. 
Online	distribution		 1.2.2 
Online distribution channels accounted for about ten percent of total music 
sales in the full year of 2006, up from 5.5% in 2005.9 The record companies’ 
8   See Guibault et al. Study on the Implementation and Effect in Member States’ Law of 
Directive 2001/29/EC on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related 
Rights in the Information Society, 2007, p. 177, available at: http://www.ivir.nl/publica-
tions/guibault/Infosoc_report_2007.pdf. See also Digital Music News, 10 January 2007, 
available at: http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/stories/011007em.
9   IFPI:07 Digital Music Report, p. 5, available at:http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/digital-
music-report-2007.pdf.9 c h a p t e r  o n e   state of Play: DRM-protected Music Interoperability
digital music sales reached USD 2 billion in 2006 and continues to grow.10 
The music has been distributed over nearly 500 online music services in 40 
countries, run by major content providers, third parties/intermediaries, ISPs, 
content portals, and mobile content suppliers. New online business models 
include digital downloads (e.g. iTunes Store) or subscriptions services (e.g. 
Rhapsody, Napster, and eMusic), including portable versions (e.g. Napster 
To Go).
At present, the large majority of the offerings licensed by the big record labels 
uses DRM schemes to regulate the various aspects of digital music usage, 
including, for instance, the type and number of devices on which the down-
loaded or streamed song can be played, the number of CDs on which it may 
be burned, or the possibilities of transferring the file to portable devices such 
as cell phones or MP3 players.11 In essence, four main DRM systems have 
been developed and used in the area of digital music, the first two currently 
being the most important ones:
FairPlay is the DRM system created by Apple and used by the iPod,  •	
iTunes, and the leading online music service iTunes Store.
Windows Media DRM, consisting of a number of components, is Mi- •	
crosoft’s DRM audio and video scheme for the Windows Media plat-
form.
OpenMG is the DRM music scheme that was used by Sony until it  •	
abandoned its online music store in August 2007.
HelixDRM by RealNetworks is a protection scheme for audio and video  •	
formats that has been used by a range of music and video services, in-
cluding Rhapsody.  
As mentioned, DRM systems also regulate the extent to which digital prod-
ucts and services interoperate. In the case of DRM-protected online music, 
10   Id., p. 2.
11   See also OECD, Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, Committee on Con-
sumer Policy, Report on Disclosure Issues Related to the Use Of Copy Control and Dig-
ital Rights Management Technologies, pp. 5-9 (2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/47/31/36546422.pdf.c a s e s t u d y   DRM-protected Music Interoperability and eInnovation 10
many observers – including lawmakers12 and government agencies – have di-
agnosed relatively low degrees of interoperability. In fact, several major players 
in the online music space have decided to keep their DRM ecosystems and 
platforms closed. 
Most prominently, Apple, as the owner of the leading iTunes Store, has re-
fused to license its FairPlay DRM system to its competitors, including on-
line music stores and device manufacturers (with the exception of licenses for 
Motorola mobile devices). As a result, its products and music services only 
support DRM-protected content if it is encoded with Apple’s closed DRM 
system. For example, music purchased from the iTunes Store and protected 
by its FairPlay technology can only be played on iPods, certain Motorola cell 
phones, and Apple’s own iPhone, but not on other portable music players 
such as Microsoft’s Zune. Audio files in unprotected formats, in contrast, can 
be imported. Thus, it is possible to rip songs from an unprotected CD and to 
import them into the iTunes library and play them on the iPod. 
In contrast to Apple, Microsoft’s initial DRM strategy has been to license 
its Windows Media DRM system to other market players as part of the so-
called “PlaysForSure initiative.” License holders include online music stores 
and device manufacturers. Among the online stores that sell digital content 
protected by Windows Media DRM are Napster, DirectSong, MTV’s URGE 
and Unbox. Hardware device vendors supporting Windows Media DRM 
wrapped content include, among others, Motorola, SanDisk, Philips and 
Toshiba. Among these players and their services and devices there is a high 
degree of interoperability, but not vis-à-vis other important market forces, 
most notably market leader Apple. Further, Microsoft recently revisited its 
approach to interoperability with regard to Windows Media DRM and its 
Windows Media Player. In particular, Microsoft uses a variant of the Win-
dows Media DRM for its portable player Zune and the corresponding online 
store Zune Marketplace. Consequently, music that is compatible with Mi-
crosoft’s PlaysForSure initiative (e.g. music bought in Napster) may not be 
used on its Zune player. Zune software can import unprotected audio files in 
formats such as WMA, MP3, AAC and the like.
12   See, e.g., Hearing on Digital Music Interoperability and Availability before the Subcom-
mittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the Committee on the Jud-
ciary, House of Representatives, 109th Congress, First Session, April 6, 2005, Serial No. 
109-9, available at  http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/printers/109th/20389.pdf.11 c h a p t e r  o n e   state of Play: DRM-protected Music Interoperability
Similar to Apple’s and, more recently, Microsoft’s approach, Sony established 
an exclusive linkage between its Connect Store and the Sony players. In con-
trast to Microsoft and Apple, Sony also owns a music catalogue; Sony’s mar-
ket significance in online music distribution is, however, comparatively low. 
RealNetwork’s Helix DRM, the fourth DRM system in use in the market 
for digital music distribution, has been partly made available to third parties, 
such as portable devices from SanDisk; however, RealNetworks announced in 
spring 2007 that it would no longer sell its technology, but will continue to 
support existing customers, including Rhapsody.13 
The examples provided so far reveal an online music ecosystem where DRM 
interoperability issues are among its central problems. However, several devel-
opments should be noted where the DRM interoperability challenge has been 
avoided. First, a subscription-based service called eMusic allows permanent 
music downloads as DRM-free MP3s. Its music catalog consists of over two 
million songs from independent labels. Second, two of the four major record 
labels have moved tentatively away from DRM. EMI recently announced that 
it would license its music catalog DRM-free and at higher sound quality to 
online music stores in return for a premium. Following this announcement, 
iTunes Store has offered DRM-free tracks from EMI at a slightly higher price 
($1.29 per song instead of $0.99).14 Continuing the trend, Universal Music, 
the record label with the largest market share, has temporarily made a por-
tion of its library available for DRM-free sale on a variety of online music 
stores.15 It remains to be seen how these arrangements will develop over time 
and whether the other labels will follow suite. Abandoning DRM altogether 
would obviously sidestep the DRM interoperability issue entirely with respect 
to online music distribution. Amazon.com, a long-anticipated entrant to the 
online music market that launched a beta version of its music store in the 
US in September 2007, is an interesting case in this context.16 All songs on 
Amazon MP3, including songs from EMI, Universal, and independent labels, 
are available as DRM-free downloads.
13   Rosenblatt, RealNetworks Takes Helix DRM Off the Market, March 6, 2007, available at: 
www.drmwatch.com/drmtech/article.php/3663976.
14   See: http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/04/02itunes.html.
15   http://new.umusic.com/News.aspx?NewsId=539.
16  http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=176060&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=1055053&highlight=.c a s e s t u d y   DRM-protected Music Interoperability and eInnovation 12
Despite this tentative movement away from DRM, most market observers 
would agree that the current online music ecosystem is still characterized by 
a relatively low degree of interoperability as defined in this study and as far as 
music licensed by the major labels is concerned. The assessment of this state of 
play requires an overview of the benefits and drawbacks of different levels of 
interoperability. This is the theme of part 2 of this paper. In the next section, 
however, we will first discuss some of the key forces at play to gain a better 
understanding of what has shaped the current state and may influence the 
future level of DRM interoperability. 
Forces at play: some drivers and inhibitors  1.3 
Digital music distribution is a complex system. Technically, it requires the 
implementation and functional interplay of advanced digital technologies. 
Additionally, it consists of a relatively complicated network of market ac-
tors whose incentive structures are sometimes aligned and other times dia-
metrically opposed. Apart from market factors, a complex set of legal norms 
governs the digital music distribution system, including copyright law, con-
sumer protection law, anti-trust law, and the like. Dynamic communities of 
like-minded users, as well as user expectations and preferences, also play an 
increasingly important role. These four characteristics have to be taken into 
account if one seeks to identify factors and forces that shape the state of play 
in the digital music ecosystem. In this paper, however, we focus on three 
issues: First, we address important aspects that illustrate the technical chal-
lenges associated with achieving high levels of interoperability among DRM 
systems. Second, we outline the incentive structure of different stakeholders 
in the online music space that might point toward different levels of DRM 
interoperability. Finally, we address the interaction between the legal system 
and levels of interoperability. 
Complex	technology 1.3.1 
A look at a basic DRM reference model with key domains such as
Packaging, rules generation, and modification; •	
Value chain management and licensing services; •	
Consumption services; •	
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Security and protected platform services; •	
The corresponding functionalities illustrate the technological complexity  •	
behind DRM schemes as applied to digital content.17 
Against this backdrop, it does not come as a surprise that various theoretical 
approaches to DRM interoperability have been proposed. Process-oriented 
approaches ask how different pieces of the functionality can be implement-
ed among actors when different DRM technologies are used.18 In contrast, 
architecture-oriented approaches conceptualize interoperability from the per-
spective of a layered DRM framework.19 
From the practical perspective, much of the debate in the recent past has 
centered on ways to achieve a common understanding of usage rights. DRM 
systems, as mentioned above, express and enforce usage rights related to a 
specific digital file. DRM systems describe authorized usage (i.e., usage poli-
cies like, “this song may only be played on 5 authorized computers”) through 
meta-data that is associated with the content, and is expressed through what 
is called in the industry a Rights Expression Language (REL).20 In order to 
successfully manage protected content, it is therefore necessary that the dif-
ferent technical elements “understand” the same language. Take, for example, 
a band that distributes a DRM-protected music track over an online music 
platform specializing in independent music with the intent that it be play-
able on a user’s PC and mobile phone. If several parties along the value chain 
use DRM systems from different vendors, all involved DRM systems must 
understand the same “language” in order to give effect to the instructions 
17   See, e.g., Koenen et al., supra note 5, pp. 5-9.
18   For approaches along the process line see, e.g.,  Koenen et al., supra note 5 (exploring 
three ways to achieve interoperability: full format interoperability, connected interoper-
ability, configuration-driven interoperability); Andreas U. Schmidt, Omid Tafreschi, and 
Ruben Wolf, Interoperability Challenges for DRM Systems, http://andreas.schmidt.nova-
lyst.de/docs/Interoperability_Challenges_for_DRM_Systems.pdf (connected interoper-
ability); Reihaneh Safavi-Naini, Nicholas Paul Sheppard, Takeyuki Uehara, Import/Export 
in Digital Rights Management, in: Proceedings of the Third ACM Workshop on Digital 
Rights Management, pp. 13-26, Washington D.C., October 2003 (connected interoper-
ability/translation architectures).
19   See Heileman and Jamkhedkar, supra note 4, pp.  17-26.
20   See,	e.g., Karen Coyle, Rights Expression Languages: A Report for the Library of Con-
gress (2004) for an overview.c a s e s t u d y   DRM-protected Music Interoperability and eInnovation 14
(usage rights) attached to the file. One way to ensure that usage rights will be 
understood and respected is to establish a uniform REL, and in fact several 
market players have argued that the development of a uniform REL is a first 
step toward enabling DRM interoperability. In this context, two initiatives 
have shaped the current DRM landscape:
eXtensible  Rights  Markup  Language  (XrML):  XrML,  developed  by  •	
ContentGuard (a company originally founded by Microsoft and Xerox), 
describes rights, fees, conditions, message integrity and authentication 
and is based on the “extensible markup language” (XML). Some industry 
players have regarded XrML as the basis for a universal REL as men-
tioned above. For example, XrML has been used by the Moving Pictures 
Expert Group (MPEG) as the basis for one part (Part 5) of the MPEG-
21 standard, which later became an international standard. The MPEG-
21/5 is designed for the licensing of digital audio and video content in 
particular. A version of XrML is also used in Microsoft’s DRM systems.
Open Digital Rights Language (ODRL): In digital media, one of XrML›s  •	
main competitors is ODRL. It evolved from an open process, is managed 
by an open initiative led by its founder Renato Iannella. ODRL can be 
seen as the open-source, license-free equivalent to commercial XrML.21 
In fact, ODRL is in many respects similar to MPEG 21/5.22 It is suc-
cessfully used in the area of mobile devices and has been adopted by the 
Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) as the REL for its DRM specification. 
Despite  initial  successes,  observers  doubt  whether  XrML  or  ODRL  are 
likely to become an accepted standard for expressing usage rights in DRM 
systems any time soon.23 First, each approach reportedly has its own prob-
lems. ODRL, for instance, is facing a legal challenge, as ContentGuard, the 
company that developed XrML, claims that its patents on XrML cover any 
rights expression language, including ODRL. XrML, in contrast, struggles 
with long-term sustainability in the marketplace: Two of its most important 
derivatives – Microsoft’s version of XrML and the REL forming part of the 
MPEG-21 standard – remain incompatible with each other and there are no 
21   Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger, Beyond Copyright: Managing Information Rights with DRM, 
84 Denver L. Rev. 181 (2006), p. 187.
22   Coyle, supra note 20, p. 14.
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signs that Microsoft will change that situation, according to commentators.24 
Second, the initiatives have to contend with a growing number of proprietary 
DRM systems of competitors (and consortia).25 More fundamentally, some 
stakeholders argue that a single universal REL is not necessary for achieving a 
common understanding of usage rights. Rather, different DRM systems only 
need to be able to interpret one another’s usage restrictions. 
Along these lines, the Coral Consortium is developing specifications that will 
allow different DRM systems to “talk to one another.” The consortium was 
formed in 2004 by a cross-industry group of seven major media and technol-
ogy companies to promote DRM interoperability. Its basic approach is “to 
separate content interoperability from choice of DRM technology by devel-
oping and standardizing a set of specifications focused on interoperability 
between different DRM technologies rather than specifying DRM technolo-
gies” and to create an “interoperability layer.”26 Since its launch, the consor-
tium has released several interoperability specifications and, for example, has 
successfully established “out of the box” interoperability with OMA DRM 
and Microsoft Windows Media DRM, among others.27 Despite these suc-
cesses, the initiative is generally not believed to have fully succeeded – not due 
to technical shortcomings but rather due to a lack of support by important 
market players, particularly Apple. Furthermore, the Moebius Forum aims 
at establishing interoperability between different DRM systems by enabling 
their conversion into MPEG-21, an ISO-standardized REL.28 The forum was 
founded in 2006 under the auspices of CISAC (The International Confedera-
tion of Authors and Composers Societies) and arguably will face challenges 
similar to those of the Coral Consortium.
To  sum  up,  DRM  systems  are  technically  complex,  and  interoperability 
among DRM systems from different vendors is a difficult issue to address. 
24   Mayer-Schoenberger, supra note 21, p. 187.
25   Mayer-Schoenberger, supra note 21, pp. 186 et seq.
26   Coral Consortium Press Release, Entertainment, Technology and Consumer Electronics 
Leaders Unite for DRM Interoperability, Oct. 4, 2004, available at http://www.coral-inter-
op.org/main/news/pr20041004.html.
27   Bill Rosenblatt, 2006 Year in Review: DRM Standards, December 27, 2006, http://www.
drmwatch.com/standards/print.php/3651126.
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From a technical perspective, different approaches have been proposed for the 
achievement of interoperability. In practice, much attention has been paid to 
the question of how to implement rights expression languages for the expres-
sion of usage policies and which need to be understood by the various techni-
cal elements of the DRM system if the system wants to successfully facilitate 
usage rights transactions and interdict unauthorized uses. We have outlined 
attempts aimed at creating a uniform REL. Other approaches towards DRM 
interoperability do not envision a uniform REL, but seek to define a set of 
specifications in order to create mutual “understanding” of usage restrictions 
among different DRM systems. Each of these approaches has certain merits 
and demerits, and it is currently uncertain whether one of the approaches will 
prevail. Lastly, it is important to understand that a common understanding 
of usage rights is a necessary, but not wholly sufficient condition for DRM 
interoperability. The interoperation of elements of the DRM model such as, 
for instance, identity and authentication services must also be addressed and 
present further challenges.
Dynamic	market	incentives 1.3.2 
Until recently, DRM interoperability at the application layer had largely been 
left to market forces – and several stakeholders argue that this more or less 
laissez faire approach should continue. In this section, we will take a look 
at the market forces at play by discussing some of the economic incentives 
regarding the creation of DRM music interoperability, assuming that DRM 
providers could overcome technological challenges and achieve high degrees 
of interoperability among their systems (e.g. by way of DRM licensing) if 
they have incentives to do so. The starting place for the discussion is the 
observation that both consumer surveys and common sense suggest that at 
least consumers have a strong preference for interoperable music systems and 
applications.29 Why, then are we still facing a DRM interoperability problem 
as outlined above? At least part of the answer lies in the rather heterogeneous 
and dynamic incentive structure among key participants in the online music 
29   Other stakeholders have also expressed their preference for DRM interoperability. See, 
e.g.,  Barney Wragg, a content industry representative (Universal Music Group Interna-
tional), at the OECD conference on the Future Digital Economy (statement available at: 
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market.30 Linking back to the examples provided above, Apple’s and Micro-
soft’s DRM interoperability approaches are illustrative. 
As noted, Apple as the market leader in the online music business has a very 
restrictive interoperability policy as far as its DRM system FairPlay is con-
cerned. Reportedly, it has licensed its DRM system only in a single case (Mo-
torola mobile devices) and has responded negatively to technological attempts 
by competitors seeking to establish higher degrees of interoperability. Observ-
ers have suggested that such an approach aimed at restricting interoperability 
is a key element of Apple’s business model.  First, it has been argued that the 
exclusive link between iTunes and iPod creates significant entry barriers for 
portable players and, to some extent, for music download services. Second, 
the restrictive approach is believed to have leveraged Apple’s strong position 
in the market for portable music devices into a similar position among mu-
sic downloading services. Finally, Apple’s strategy arguably allows for greater 
price discrimination vis-à-vis a consumer base that is tightly linked to both 
the music store and the music player and at the same time increases consum-
ers’ switching costs.31 However, Apple officials have contested whether this 
analysis is an adequate account of its business motives. After being heavily 
criticized by different stakeholders, especially consumers’ organizations, Ap-
ple’s CEO and co-founder Steve Jobs denied in a recent statement that the 
lack of interoperability has been part of Apple’s business strategy. Instead, he 
argued that it was a mere consequence of the record labels’ requirement that 
Apple provide effective DRM protection, while Apple in turn could only 
30   See also generally, Olivier Bomsel & Anne-Gaëlle Geffroy, DRMs, Innovation and Crea-
tion, Communications & Strategies No. 62, 2nd Q. (2006), pp. 35-47, available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=992817 for discussion of the interplay of interests and economic 
forces among content owners, content distributors, network providers, and equipment 
manufacturers. For a discussion of companies’ incentives to offer conversion tech-
nologies in different market circumstances, see: Charles Z. Liu, Esther Gal-Or, Chris F. 
Kemerer & Michael D. Smith, Winners Take Some: The Impact of Conversion Technolo-
gies on Network Effects in Digital Goods Markets, April 2007, available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=980726. See also, Sang Hoo Bae & Pilsik Choi, Firms’ Optimal Digital 
Rights Management (DRM) Strategies: The Effects of Public Copy Protection and DRM 
Compatibility, 2007, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1013188 for discussion of the impacts of the degree of DRM compatibility on compa-
nies’ DRM protection level of digital products.
31   See Gasser et al. iTunes, How Copyright, Contract, and Technology Shape the Busi-
ness of Digital Media – A Case Study, available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/media/
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guarantee the required level of protection if its DRM system was not licensed 
to other parties. Jobs went on to ask record labels to completely abolish the re-
quirement of DRM protection.32 Whether intentionally or not, non-interop-
erability has proven to be a very successful business strategy for Apple to date, 
providing strong incentives against high levels of DRM interoperability. 
We have already mentioned Microsoft’s DRM media interoperability policy. 
Viewed from the user’s perspective, the second most important player’s in-
teroperability strategy has not been very consistent. 
As noted, Microsoft has followed a relatively open licensing strategy for  •	
its Windows Media DRM, enabling interoperability among services and 
devices. Arguably, the PlaysForSure initiative has served several business 
goals, such as increasing the distribution and importance of the Windows 
Media Player jukebox (including the Windows Media DRM), increasing 
the Internet audience on their MSN Network service, and facilitating 
Micosoft’s entry into the digital living room business. Reportedly, these 
were also the guiding objectives when Microsoft launched its MSN Mu-
sic Store in October 2004.33 
In contrast, Microsoft did not opt for DRM interoperability when in- •	
troducing the Zune audio player and the Zune Marketplace online store, 
respectively, but rather designed a closed ecosystem like Apple’s iPod-
iTunes  model.  In  addition,  Microsoft  limited  DRM  interoperability 
within its own DRM ecosystem: MSN Music Store closed its virtual 
doors, and songs previously bought on it cannot be played on Zune.34 
Market observers have attributed Microsoft’s shift in its DRM interoperabil-
ity strategy to the low market performance of the MSN Music Store vis-à-vis 
the successful Apple iTunes Store. 
32   Jobs, Thoughts on Music, February 6, 2007, http://www.apple.com/hotnews/thought-
sonmusic.
33   OECD, Directorate For Science, Technology and Industry Committee for Information, 
Computer and Communications Policy, Digital Broadband Content: Music, p. 64, avail-
able at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/2/34995041.pdf.
34   However, songs downloaded from the Zune Marketplace may be played with the Win-
dows Media Player and put on a PlaysForSure device, but Microsoft does not offer 
customer support for anyone trying to achieve this goal, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
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These two examples – others could be added – illustrate at least three interest-
ing phenomena that shape the DRM interoperability landscape. First, DRM 
interoperability strategies might vary even within one (relatively heterogene-
ous) group of stakeholders.  Second, there are situations in which key players 
in the online music market have economic disincentives to promote DRM 
interoperability, despite strong user preferences to the contrary. The desire 
to control secondary markets, or to increase switching costs for consumers, 
to name just two examples, might motivate business strategies that lead to 
non-interoperable environments. Finally, a single player’s attitudes towards 
interoperability may change over a relatively short period of time. These three 
observations represent complicating factors for assessing the promises and 
limitations of a market-driven approach to DRM music interoperability.  
Conflicting	influences	of	law 1.3.3 
The legal system, too, shapes the DRM music interoperability playing- field. 
On the one hand, general laws – like consumer protection laws – might apply 
to issues relevant to DRM interoperability. On the other hand, we have seen 
the emergence of specific laws aimed at addressing the DRM interoperability 
challenge. The recently enacted French interoperability provision (discussed 
in section 3.2.2.2) is a case-in-point in this context. Some aspects of the legal 
system foster DRM music interoperability, others discourage it. In the follow-
ing paragraphs, we will use this rough distinction for analytical purposes only, 
acknowledging that laws (e.g., patent law) can be used in more than one way 
and for various purposes. 
A first set of rules that can be used against high levels of DRM interoper-
ability is patent protection of DRM technology. Depending on the scope of a 
particular patent, a patent holder may be able to control the design of devices 
or applications intended to work with files protected by its DRM technology. 
Under such a scenario, patent law can be used to preserve a closed DRM eco-
system, or to make the creation of an interoperable DRM framework more 
expensive by extracting licensing fees. The issue of patent protection of DRM 
technologies or certain components of it, respectively, has recently been raised 
in the context of ODRL’s rights expression language. ContentGuard, the 
owner of several patents related to the XrML REL (see above), argues that its 
patents do not just apply to the specific characteristics of XrML, but to any 
implementation of a rights expression language, including ODRL’s version. 
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service provider or device manufacturer that implements the Open Mobile 
Alliance (OMA) DRM 1.0, which includes ODRL as part of its specification, 
is obliged to pay a levy to MPEG-LA consortium members. It remains to be 
seen if and how this move influences the creation of an interoperable DRM 
ecosystem in the mobile entertainment industry.35
Another complex interplay between DRM interoperability and the law re-
lates to legal frameworks that govern technological protection measures. Such 
frameworks – known as anti-circumvention legislation and introduced by the 
1996 WIPO Internet Treaties – provide an additional layer of protection for 
digital content by prohibiting the “hacking” of DRM-systems and technolo-
gies alike and banning the trafficking in so-called circumvention devices.36 In 
the interoperability context, the question arises as to what extent such provi-
sions allow reverse engineering of a DRM-system. The EU Copyright Direc-
tive (EUCD) of 2001, for instance, does not answer this question. Recital 54 
of the EUCD only mentions that interoperability “should be encouraged,” 
without providing further guidance. However, good arguments have been 
put forward that the anti-circumvention framework itself (mainly Art. 6 of 
the EUCD) allows the design of interoperable systems by outlawing only traf-
ficking in such circumvention devices that are (inter alia) primarily designed 
and marketed for the circumvention of effective technological protection 
measures (TPM). In other words, “hacking” a certain DRM system might be 
legal under the EUCD if it does not compromise the limitation of use of a 
DRM-ed work.37 However, the national implementations of the EUCD vary 
significantly and courts have not yet resolved this issue.38 In addition, reverse 
35   For a broader discussion, see Susanne Guth and Renato Iannella, Critical review of 
MPEG LA software patent claims, available at http://www.indicare.org/tiki-read_article.
php?articleId=90.
36   See, e.g., Urs Gasser, Legal Frameworks and Technological Protection of Digital Con-
tent:  Moving Forward Towards a Best Practice Model, 17 Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & 
Ent. L.J. 39 (2006) for a discussion of the international legal framework with regard to the 
protection of technical protection measures.
37   See Mikko Välimäki & Ville Oksanen, DRM Interoperability and Intellectual Property Poli-
cy in Europe, available at  http://www.valimaki.com/org/drm_interoperability_final.pdf.
38   In this context, it is noteworthy that at least one Italian Court has ruled that the use of 
modified chips aimed at restoring the full functionality of a Sony PlayStation (incl. its 
ability to read all discs from all markets despite region coding) is not illegal under the 
EUCD’s anti-circumvention provisions. See Andrea Glorioso, EUCD Wiki, available at 
http://eucd.wizards-of-os.org/index.php/Italy#Anti-Circumvention_Provisions.21 c h a p t e r  o n e   state of Play: DRM-protected Music Interoperability
engineering is usually outlawed under the applicable terms of service.39 The 
situation under the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), the 
EUCD’s counterpart, is somewhat different in the sense that Sec. 1201(f) 
sets forth a specific, but narrow reverse engineering provision. The exception 
allows reverse engineering of computer programs if the acting party lawfully 
obtains the program, seeks permission from the copyright holder, uses the 
results only for creating an interoperable computer program and does not 
publish them. Most importantly in the context of this paper, the resulting 
software may only interoperate with the reverse engineered software and not 
with data designed for that software. Sec. 1201(f) applies, in other words, 
only to software-to-software interoperability and does not allow reverse engi-
neering to enable interoperation between software and the DRM-ed content 
itself (software-to-data interoperability).40 
In cases where intellectual property rights are exercised to keep DRM systems 
closed and the refusal to interoperate is used as a lever for anti-competitive 
behavior, competition law might level the playing field. Competition law may 
become particularly relevant in cases where a company with a dominant mar-
ket position refuses to license its DRM technology, attempting to dominate 
an important component of a layer and to use that dominance to frustrate 
competition in other components (vertical leveraging).41 To date, however, 
there is no case law at the EU level where competition law has been applied 
to the DRM interoperability problem. But there are important cases (IMS 
Health and Magill, but also the anti-trust actions against Microsoft) illustrat-
ing how competition law – at least in exceptional circumstances – can give 
39   For a detailed analysis of the copyright-contract interplay in the online music context, 
see Gasser et al., supra note 31, pp. 13 et seq. 
40   Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d, 
273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).  See	also	Davidson & Associates, Inc. v. Internet Gateway, 
334 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (E.D. Mo. 2004), aff’d sub	nom Davidson & Associates, Inc. v. 
Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005), both available at http://www.eff.org/IP/Emulation/
Blizzard_v_bnetd/.  In Davidson	&	Associates, the exceptions under § 1201(f) were held 
not to apply where the defendants did not have the authorization of the content owners, 
did not conduct circumvention solely for the purpose of achieving interoperability with 
an independently created software program, freely distributed the circumvention tool on 
the internet, and were found to have otherwise infringed copyright.
41   See Mark Cooper, Antitrust as Consumer Protection in the New Economy: Lessons from 
the Microsoft Case, 52 Hastings Law Journal 813 (April 2001), available at http://www.
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the need for interoperability more weight than the IP claims of a dominant 
player. While IMS Health and Magill are in part based on an assessment of 
whether the refusal to give access to a product or service prevents the emer-
gence of a new product, in its Microsoft decision the European Commission 
raised the question of whether the refusal to license reduces the incentive 
to innovate throughout the industry. In its recent judgment, the European 
Court of First Instance largely confirmed the Commission’s decision and stat-
ed that the conditions for exceptional circumstances were fulfilled in the case 
before the court. At the same time, the court clarified that the Commission’s 
previous decision should not be read as if there were a new evaluation test to 
be introduced that balances incentives to innovate of the dominant company 
against those of competitors.42 At the member state level, the question of re-
fusal to license came up for discussion in 2004, when VirginMedia attempted 
to gain access to iTunes’ FairPlay system by using French competition law. 
The French competition authority, however, ruled in favor of Apple, partly 
because it considered the (actual and potential) market for music players at 
the time to be sufficiently competitive.43
Another important area of law that has an impact on the degree of DRM 
interoperability is consumer protection. European consumer protection au-
thorities in particular have addressed DRM interoperability issues within the 
last few years. The Norwegian Consumer Ombudsman, for instance, has been 
very critical of Apple’s iTunes Store interoperability policy in response to a 
complaint by the consumer council. The Ombudsman argues that “iTunes’ 
DRM is an unreasonable technical term of use, in so far as it prevents pur-
chasers of music files at iTunes from using other MP3 players than iPods,” 
and that the technical terms violate the Norwegian act relating to the control 
of marketing and contract terms and conditions.44 The case is still ongoing. 
42   See N 705 et seq. of the judgment (case T-201/04).
43   See, e.g. Natali Helberger, Virgin Media versus iTunes, available at http://www.indicare.
org/tiki-read_article.php?articleId=150. For an economic analysis, see François Lévêque, 
Is Online Music Locked in by Leveraging?, September 2006, available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=951893. For an analysis of the antitrust allega-
tions against Apple, see also Nicola F. Sharpe & Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Is Apple Playing 
Fair? Navigating the iPod FairPlay DRM Controversy, 5 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop 2, 
2007, p. 331 et seq.
44   The Norwegian Consumer Ombudsman in its complaint against the iTunes MusicStore, 
p. 3. available at: http://forbrukerportalen.no/filearchive/Complaint%20against%20
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A French court, to take another example, fined EMI Music France for selling 
CDs with DRM protection schemes that would not play on car radios and 
computers. EMI was found to have violated consumer protection law because 
it did not appropriately inform consumers of these restrictions. The court 
obliged EMI to label its CDs with the text: “Attention – cannot be listened to 
on all players or car radios.”45 At the EU level, finally, a recent proposal by the 
European Consumers’ Organisation suggests the inclusion of DRM-related 
provisions in the Unfair Contract Directive. This proposal reflects the idea 
that consumer protection authorities – like the Norwegian Ombudsman – 
should also be able to intervene against unfair consumer contract terms if the 
terms are “code“ rather than “law-based.”46
The preceding paragraphs illustrate that the current state of DRM music in-
teroperability has not entirely been left to the evolutionary forces of the mar-
ket. Instead, the present level of interoperability in digital music is also the 
result of multi-faceted interactions with the legal system, which on the one 
hand enables businesses to establish and maintain closed DRM systems via 
contract, copyright and anti-circumvention laws, but on the other hand has 
also been used to seek a more interoperable DRM ecosystem (consumer pro-
tection laws, competition law). The finding that the legal system pulls music 
DRM interoperability in conflicting directions must be taken into account 
when considering future approaches to DRM interoperability in section 3. 
45   For an analysis, see Natali Helberger, Thou shalt not mislead thy customer! The pitfalls of 
labelling and transparency, available at http://www.ivir.nl/publications/helberger/INDICA-
REMonitor230205.pdf.
46   Further, it is expected that the German Charta for consumer sovereignty in the digital 
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AssessIng DRM MusIc  2
InteRoPeRAbIlIty  
In the previous section, we have mapped the current state of DRM music in-
teroperability and the technological, economic, and legal forces of influence. 
In this section, we outline some of the merits and demerits generally associat-
ed with high levels of DRM interoperability. Particular attention will be paid 
to the question of to what extent higher degrees of DRM interoperability are 
likely to foster innovation in e-environments. In this context, it is important 
to recall the scope of this study: We focus on interoperability among DRM 
systems and do not discuss the pros and cons of using such systems in the 
music ecosystem at all.  Consequently, we do not explore the range of innova-
tions at the content layer (e.g. music mashups, sampling, parodies, etc.) that 
might be possible in a DRM-free music space.
Possible	benefits 2.1 
Competition	and	innovation 2.1.1 
Interoperable DRM systems allow consumers of digital music to transfer their 
music collection from one device or service to another, i.e., to switch between 
different vendors. Conversely, it is more difficult to change platforms in an 
ecosystem of vertically integrated and non-interoperable DRM systems; in 
this scenario, users are likely to stick to the products that support one par-
ticular DRM system. It has thus been argued that enhanced DRM interop-
erability would increase competition among different vendors in the digital 
music space, and competition, in turn, not only reduces prices but also sets 
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incentives for product and service innovation.47 Additionally, higher levels 
of DRM interoperability would not only increase actual, but also potential 
competition by reducing market-entry barriers for new players.  
A high level of DRM interoperability is likely to spur innovation not only 
by reducing lock-in effects and lowering entry barriers, but also by increas-
ing user demand. Policy reports and industry representatives suggest that the 
usage restrictions associated with low levels of DRM incompatibility and the 
lack of transparency frustrate users and hamper consumer confidence, which 
in turn might depress the growth of the online music market.48 Conversely, 
higher levels of DRM interoperability might lead to a greater consumer base 
and thus induce companies to enter the online music market with innovative 
products and services or motivate incumbent players to improve their market 
position via product differentiation (e.g. a wider variety of playback devices, 
such as in-home networks, jukeboxes, portable players, etc.).
In contrast, it has also been argued that low levels of interoperability may 
set incentives to innovate by promising higher or even monopoly profits to 
successful participants.49 According to this argument, innovators would be 
more likely to incur the risk and expense of developing an innovation if they 
expect to make higher profits due to a closed, non-interoperable DRM sys-
tem. Innovative activity would not only be encouraged by competition in 
the market, i.e., competition between components inside an interoperable 
DRM ecosystem, but also by competition for the market, i.e., competition 
47   See also the arguments of Bomsel & Geffroy, supra note 30, p. 45 that DRM incompat-
ibility may represent a form of “moral hazard,” resulting in a failure to maximize welfare. 
For a discussion of potentially detrimental effects on innovation if intellectual property 
rights are used principally as strategic weapons which arguably is facilitated in the age 
of new technologies, see: Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Strategic Behaviors and Competition, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=586483.
48   See, e.g., IFPI Digital Music Report , p. 3 (2005) (“One important problem that hinders 
the growth of the on-line music business is the lack of interoperability between services 
and devices. The danger is of wide-scale consumer confusion and wasted opportuni-
ties in a market which has an extraordinary growth potential.”) See also OECD, Working 
Party on the Information Society, Digital Broadband Content: Music, December 2005, 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/2/34995041.pdf, p. 86 (For maximum 
growth to occur, technological protection measures should be “utilised or implemented 
in as interoperable fashion as the various market sectors will permit.”).
49   The case-in-point, again, is Apple’s iTunes Store, cf. Gasser et. al, supra note 31, p. 11. c a s e s t u d y   DRM-protected Music Interoperability and eInnovation 26
between  different  non-interoperable  DRM  standards  (“standards  race”).50 
In this scenario, competition may exist in the form of “creative destruction” 
among “temporary monopolists” that may come to replace one another by 
introducing entirely new ways of doing business (so-called Schumpeterian 
rivalry).51 According to this view, if a product or service enters the market that 
is substantially better than the market leader’s offer, it will succeed and replace 
it (“leapfrog competition”). Even the proponents of Schumpeterian competi-
tion in the DRM music market, however, acknowledge that “this [form of] 
competition may create some hiccups and difficulties for interoperability as 
it goes on,” but argue that the “innovation benefits are worth it.”52 Critics, in 
contrast, go a step further and doubt whether the suggested development will 
take place vis-à-vis the platform switching costs as well as the (indirect) net-
work effects within the closed DRM ecosystem that might prevent potential 
competitors from succeeding and consolidating the market leader’s dominant 
position.53
50   See, e.g., Nicolas Economides, Desirability of Compatibility in the Absence of Network 
Externalities, 79 Am. Econ. Rev. 1165, 1989 (1989) where the author explains how “[i]
n an assymmetric setting a firm can sometimes introduce a new incompatible product 
attempting to establish a new industry “standard,” and as a consequence establish itself 
, at least in perception, as the leader of the industry.”
51   Specifically, it has been argued that in the market for digital music a non-interoperable 
vertically integrated ecosystem (Apple’s iTunes system) was apparently needed to devel-
op enough momentum to create a market for online distribution, as previous standard-
ization efforts (such as the Secure Digital Music Initiative) did not succeed in enabling a 
sustainable and successful business model.
52   Prepared Statement of Raymond Gifford (The Progress & Freedom Foundation) at 
the Hearing before the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop-
erty of the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 109th Congress, 
First Session, April 5, 2005, available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/
printers/109th/20389.pdf, p. 12.
53   See	also, Bomsel & Geffroy, supra note 30, p. 44 (“The impact of the incompatibility of 
DRMs on consumers is not unanimously considered negative, as it may result in a price 
decrease: if there are no network effects, incompatible vertically integrated systems face 
more elastic demand than compatible components . . . . However, con-sumer surplus 
may not be superior to cases where systems are compatible. Indeed, compatibility 
in-creases variety, enabling consumers to mix and match . . . . However, in the case of 
incompatibility, consumers remain free to accept or refuse each distributor’s offer. This 
rule mostly applies to dedicated networks similar to broadcasting.”) (citations omitted). 
For a broad overview of the economics of networks, see: Joseph Farrell & Paul Klemper-
er, Coordination and Lock-in: Competition with Switching Costs and Networks Effects, 
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For another wrinkle on this issue, assume there is a current market leader 
that has pursued a closed DRM interoperability approach, and that market 
leader is forced to open up its platform – for instance as a result of an anti-
trust intervention. Even in such a scenario, innovation may not result. The 
dominant player likely developed its innovation with a view to appropriating 
the (monopoly) profits of its investment; if these profits diminish due to an 
enforced opening of its DRM ecosystem, other potential innovators might be 
less inclined to develop and introduce new products and services, since they 
have to expect a similar pattern to occur in the future.54 Alternatively, new 
players may engage in leapfrog innovation, but will try to extract higher mo-
nopoly profits once they have come up with an innovative product since they 
know, based on market observation, that such a situation may be short-lived; 
or they might innovate in at least a partly interoperable fashion to stave off 
external (i.e., antitrust) intervention. 
Another complication arises from the observation that the success of innova-
tive activities in networked markets depends on users’ expectations regarding 
their market acceptance. Only if consumers expect an innovative product or 
service to become generally accepted will they switch from the old to new 
platforms. Of course, there are several possible criteria that might form these 
expectations, such as a company’s reputations, marketing efforts, financial 
strength, or product pre-announcements.55
Autonomy,	choice,	and	flexibility	 2.1.2 
While it remains contested what level of DRM interoperability will increase 
available options in the future by creating the proper incentives for firms to 
innovate, there is little controversy that the current state of low-level interop-
erability in the online music market impairs certain stakeholders’ ability to 
chose freely among music services and MP3 devices. The next paragraphs 
look into the autonomy, choice, and flexibility of users on the one hand and 
content providers on the other. 
54   See, e.g., Thomas O. Barnett, Interoperability between Antitrust and Intellectual Proper-
ty, Presentation to the George Mason University School of Law Symposium, September 
2006, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/218316.htm.
55   Katz/Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 Am. Econ. Rev. 
424, 425, 439 (1985) and Farrell/Katz, The effects of antitrust and intellectual property 
law on compatibility and innovation, Antitrust Bulletin 1998, p. 609 et seq., 618 that 
analytically distinguish three categories of consumer expectations: expectations tracking 
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In the current DRM interoperability debate, the reduction of user choice 
ranks among the most frequently mentioned negative effects associated with 
the current state of affairs. If DRM systems and applications are not interop-
erable, as the argument goes, users cannot freely choose among competitive 
and efficient options with regard to components that may be tested, mixed, 
and matched for specific purposes. This is the case if, for instance, the user 
seeks to join one online store (e.g. Napster), but is prevented from doing so 
because her portable music device (e.g. iPod) doesn’t allow her to play the 
songs bought on the competitor’s platform. The possibility of overcoming the 
restrictions imposed by the non-interoperable DRM regimes does not con-
stitute an efficient option for consumers. While the use of a tool that strips 
the music of DRM protection is likely to qualify as an illegal act of circum-
vention, other suggested ways to override the lack of interoperability56 – like 
burning a CD with the songs purchased on one store and re-importing it into 
the library of another platform provider – is costly, cumbersome and may re-
duce the sound quality of the purchased music. A high degree of DRM music 
interoperability, in contrast, gives users choice, flexibility, and convenience.57
Low levels of interoperability also affect other stakeholders’ freedom to make 
choices. Content providers in particular are constrained by non-interoperable 
DRM systems of media distributors where they restrict the business models 
that may be supported. In this way, flexibility with regard to business models 
is decreased and the markets that content providers can reach are ultimately 
narrowed. Furthermore, content providers may at least in theory run the risk 
of being locked into a gatekeeper-like distribution channel vis-à-vis a domi-
nant online music distributor. Again, higher levels of DRM interoperability 
tend to enhance choice and flexibility.
Access,	diversity,	and	openness 2.1.3 
From a societal perspective, the main concern about the current low degree 
of DRM music interoperability is that we run the risk of failing to redeem 
the promise of the new technologies.58 As noted above, several observers have 
argued that a continued lack of interoperability could frustrate consumers 
56   See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 54.
57   X. Wang, On DRM Interoperability and Compatibility, 2005, available at: http://web.
cs.missouri.edu/~zeng/CCNC05DRM/OnDRMInteroperabilityCompatibility-CCNC05.pdf
58   Sensu William Fisher, Promises to Keep (2004), p. 18 et seq.29 c h a p t e r  t w o   Assessing DRM Music Interoperability
and ultimately slow down the development of digital content. It is generally 
acknowledged that online distribution creates efficiency gains by drastically 
reducing transaction costs, a feature that in turn leads to greater access to 
music at lower prices. Consequently, to constrain the future growth of online 
music distribution would also mean to leave in place access barriers that new 
technology would enable us to remove today.
If users do not embrace digital distribution due to usage restrictions resulting 
from non-interoperable platforms, niche markets will likely be underserved 
by content providers. Insofar as niche markets are an opportunity for a larger 
and more diverse set of musicians to reach their audience (in the Web 2.0 
jargon: to serve the “the long tail”), low levels of DRM interoperability may 
result in a negative long-term impact on cultural diversity, especially if alter-
native means of content distribution (such as P2P file-sharing) are coming 
under pressure at the same time. 
An open ICT ecosystem, properly developed and maintained, creates efficien-
cy gains by public and private sector actors through increased competition, 
access, and control. There is also a strong general argument that an open ICT 
environment fosters innovation and growth.59 While interoperability is also 
possible within a closed system, it is clearly a condition sine qua non for an 
open ICT ecosystem. The role and contours of an interoperability framework 
within an open ICT system have been described elsewhere in greater detail.60 
For our purposes, it suffices to note that DRM interoperability would be one 
element that might contribute to the building of such an open environment 
with the advantages mentioned above.
Possible drawbacks 2.2 
The previous paragraphs have highlighted the possible benefits of a digital 
music ecosystem with high levels of interoperability. However, the contested 
debate about the right degree of DRM interoperability – and the best way to 
achieve it – makes it clear that interoperability is not unanimously perceived 
as a positive feature. Rather, several observers and market players have point-
ed out that a higher level of DRM interoperability comes with costs. Three 
59   See Berkman Center for Internet & Society, Roadmap for Open ICT Ecosystems, p. 9 et 
seq., available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/epolicy/roadmap.pdf.
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main arguments against DRM interoperability have been made. First, it is 
argued that increased interoperability might compromise security. Second, 
higher levels of DRM interoperability could entail greater privacy issues than 
“segmented” DRM systems. Third, content providers with a strong interest 
in content protection might be less likely to license their content in light of 
the aforementioned security concerns, leading to a diminished universe of 
content available online. 
Security	 2.2.1 
Among the controversial issues is whether it is possible to achieve higher de-
grees of DRM interoperability without compromising security of DRM pro-
tection schemes.61 In essence, two “threat models” have been portrayed. 
More players, greater security risks: Higher degrees of DRM interoper- •	
ability require wider dissemination of sensitive information related to 
the DRM protection scheme among a greater number of market par-
ticipants, including application providers or vendors of mobile music 
devices. Generally, a growing number of parties having access to sensitive 
information increases the risk of leakage, especially in cases where the in-
centive structures among the players aren’t necessarily perfectly aligned. 
Such leakage has occurred repeatedly with DRM in the video area, first 
with CSS in first-generation DVDs (where a key was leaked from a Xing 
software decoder) and more recently with AACS for HD-DVDs (where 
a key was leaked from WinDVD).
Increased vulnerability in case of attacks: Experts agree and anecdotal  •	
evidence confirms that there is no such thing as an absolutely secure, bul-
let-proof DRM system. Indeed, most if not all DRM protection schemes 
in the music market have already been hacked – including protection 
technologies by Apple and Microsoft. In an interoperable DRM ecosys-
tem, according to this argument, the impact of one single “hack” would 
be far greater than in a world of DRM silos. Under such a scenario, 
a single leak has the potential to compromise not only one of several 
distribution channels, but the distribution of all interoperably DRM-ed 
music. In addition (and tying it to the first threat model), it has been 
61   See, e.g., the opposing statements of industry representatives, such as Steve Jobs (Ap-
ple; available at http://www.apple.com/hotnews/thoughtsonmusic/) and John Kennedy 
(IFPI; available at http://www.ifpi.org/content/section_news/20070208.html).31 c h a p t e r  t w o   Assessing DRM Music Interoperability
argued that any leakage (or “hack”) could be much more difficult to fix 
than in a world of different DRM systems, as the concerted action of a 
multitude of stakeholders would be required.62
The threat models have not gone uncontested. With regard to the first con-
cern (“more players, more leakage”), it can be argued that the law provides 
means to reduce these risks, not only in terms of general statutes but also 
in the form of confidentiality provisions in licensing agreements and cor-
responding penalty clauses in case of leakage, or the like. On the other hand, 
contracts are only as strong as the contracting parties; once critical informa-
tion has been leaked, such as the key to the DVD encryption system CSS 
that was revealed due to a poorly secured software DVD player by Xing, the 
ability to sue one’s chagrined partner is small comfort. In addition, projects 
such as Microsoft’s PlaysForSure initiative provide at least anecdotal evidence 
that DRM interoperability among multiple players does not necessarily lead 
to a less secure online music distribution environment.63
Privacy	 2.2.2 
According to some observers, an interoperable DRM regime for online music 
content could also present extensive privacy issues.  DRM systems in the 
music space are often aimed at keeping track of actions taken on the part 
of users with regard to digital music files – above all, the number of copies 
made. Other DRM systems such as pay-per-use systems must report back to 
the content owner regarding the consumer’s use of the music content.  As 
critics have pointed out, DRM systems therefore hold the potential to en-
able the monitoring of individual consumption habits on the part of content 
owners.64 If DRM systems track usage data according to an interoperable 
standard, anyone who knows or is able to discover the standard may be able 
to gain access to it. Thus, SonyBMG would not only receive information 
concerning a particular consumer’s usage habits with regard to SonyBMG 
content, but might also be able to discover that consumer’s habits with regard 
62   See Jobs, supra note32. 
63   Ken Fisher, for instance, points out that Windows Media DRM has had fewer security 
breaches than Apple’s FairPlay despite the fact that the Windows system is licensed 
out to many other parties.  Ken Fisher, Is interoperable DRM inherently less secure? The 
case of FairPlay versus Windows Media, arstechnica.com, http://arstechnica.com/news.
ars/post/20070208-8799.html.
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to other labels’ content as well.  Depending on the scenario, even interested 
parties other than content owners (e.g. marketing firms, etc.) might be able 
to monitor the consumer’s behavior. 
Privacy concerns voiced by advocates of closed DRM systems are not uni-
versally accepted. On the one hand, it remains unclear as to how realistic the 
sketched scenario is in which various stakeholders along the value chain could 
access user information. At a glance, one can imagine that access to collected 
data could be restricted by technical, organizational, or legal means, much in 
the same way that an interoperable mobile phone system, for instance, does 
not entail that all players inevitably gain access to the location data of their 
respective customers. In other words, the particular approach to DRM inter-
operability will be decisive as to whether privacy concerns are amplified when 
moving from a low to a high level of DRM interoperability. Furthermore, 
some contend that the privacy problems are a result of the use of technologi-
cal protection measures in the first place and have much less to do with the 
interoperability question at hand.65
Accessibility	 2.2.3 
As noted in the introduction, there is also an argument that high levels of 
DRM interoperability will impair the widespread accessibility of content – 
the very goal it would be designed to achieve. If content owners perceive an 
interoperable DRM framework as entailing less security for their content, 
they may be unwilling to license their content unless the distributor allays 
security concerns with its own guarantee.66 Additionally, patent protection 
relating to DRM technology may render licensing terms too costly for those 
who wish to implement it (rather than stick to a [cheaper] non-interoperable 
solution)67  Critics argue, however, that perfect protection has so far not been 
65   For most recent privacy concerns surrounding iTunes Store and its DRM-free songs, see 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/6711215.stm.
66   Apple’s CEO und co-founder Steve Jobs recently pointed to the music industry’s claim 
for secure DRM protection and considered it impossible for his company to guarantee 
adequate security when at the same time licensing its DRM system to third parties (su-
pra FN 32). As to the business-enabling function of effective DRM systems in general, 
see OECD (FN 33), p. 92.
67   As was the case with the DRM standard developed by the Open Mobile Association.  
See The Online Reporter, “PlayReady not Ready” – Launched to Spoil the Market – Says 
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a prerequisite of successful, DRM-based business models. Enforcement of us-
age restrictions via DRM (along with the legal protection of DRM schemes) 
seems to be sufficient if it deters enough to shape the behavior of the ma-
jority of users.68 Furthermore, there is a trend among content providers to 
conceptualize DRM systems not as measures against piracy, but as enablers 
for price-discrimination or as “accounting tools.”69 It is hard to see how an 
interoperable DRM system would conflict with these functionalities. Finally, 
nothing seems to suggest that the content industry has withdrawn from li-
censing content to the participants of the PlaysForSure initiative when they 
aimed to create an interoperable DRM microenvironment. 
Conclusion 2.3 
Conventional economic analysis suggests with regard to innovation that both 
benefits and costs are associated with different levels of DRM interoperability. 
Against this backdrop and without empirical evidence regarding the relation 
between DRM interoperability and innovation in the online music market, 
it would be problematic to conclude in general terms that a higher level of 
DRM interoperability necessarily leads to more innovation in the online mu-
sic space. In view of the complex interrelations among the market structure, 
legal landscape, and incentives of different stakeholders, we conclude instead 
that there is need for a case-by-case economic analysis of the particular DRM 
interoperability issues up for discussion – analogous to the types of analyses 
used in competition law cases.70 However, we have argued in the preceding 
paragraphs that additional normative arguments may tip the balance in gen-
eral terms towards higher degrees of interoperability. 
First, a qualitative analysis strongly suggests – in line with other policy re-
ports – that a high level of DRM interoperability increases autonomy, choice, 
and the flexibility of users first and foremost, but also of other stakeholders 
in the online music market such as content providers. Second, there is a link 
between DRM interoperability and access to music. Insofar as a low level of 
68   Mayer-Schoenberger, supra note21, p. 185.
69   See, e.g., various statements by industry representatives at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
entertainment/4642370.stm#5.
70   Illustrative for the complexity of such an analysis the discussion in François Lévêque, 
Is Online Music Locked in by Leveraging?, September 2006, available at http://papers.
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interoperability constrains the future growth of online music distribution as 
both industry organizations and policy think tanks argue, new technology 
or market arrangements could surmount existing barriers. Third, high levels 
of interoperability tend to contribute to the emergence of a diverse informa-
tion environment. The same applies to the online music space, since greater 
DRM interoperability may increase the market players’ incentives to serve 
niche markets. Finally, as previous research has pointed out DRM interoper-
ability is a prerequisite for the creation of a comprehensive interoperability 
framework as a central building block of an open ICT framework that results 
in efficiency gains, fosters innovation, and results in the growth of the ICT 
market in general. 
The discussions in the preceding sections suggest the acknowledgement of 
DRM interoperability as a public policy goal. While an economic analysis 
results in a “non liquet,” important values of a democratic society (such as 
choice, access, and diversity) call for a high level of DRM interoperability. 
The possible drawbacks of an interoperable DRM ecosystem, in our view, 
do not outweigh its benefits. As noted, there exists no empirical and (if, at 
all) only little anecdotal evidence that higher levels of DRM interoperability 
will compromise security and user privacy. Second, many of the concerns 
can be dealt with at the conceptual level – e.g. as a matter of interoperability 
design, or by implementing organizational and legal safeguards. Third, some 
of the drawbacks are more closely related to the concept and use of DRM as 
such rather than to the degree of interoperability. Finally, the technically most 
powerful argument, the negative impact of increased DRM interoperability 
on security, becomes less persuasive in an environment in which DRM is 
used less and less to prevent piracy than to enable innovative forms of content 
distribution and service accounting.35 c h a p t e r  t w o   Assessing DRM Music Interoperabilityc a s e s t u d y   DRM-protected Music Interoperability and eInnovation 36
APPRoAches  3
towARDs DRM MusIc 
InteRoPeRAbIlIty 
Basic Framework 3.1 
Overview 3.1.1 
DRM music interoperability can be achieved in various ways, and, in fact, 
several approaches have already been used in practice with the aim of estab-
lishing a higher degree of DRM interoperability. In very broad strokes, one 
might distinguish among the following approaches and “tools”:  
Unilateral Design. This occurs when a technology company designs its  •	
products or services in a way that interoperability is specifically a feature. 
Sun Microsystem’s DReaM project, aimed at providing an interoperable 
DRM architecture by implementing standardized interfaces and process-
es, is an illustration of this type of approach. 
Reverse engineering. In the case of reverse engineering, as noted above,  •	
a given DRM system is taken apart in order to learn how it operates and 
build an interoperable system that unilaterally supports the competitor›s 
DRM system. An example of this was RealNetworks’ Harmony software, 
discussed above.
Licensing. •	  Here, DRM interoperability is achieved by granting the con-
tracting party access to the DRM technology and the relevant technical 
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specification, including the rights associated with its use. One widely 
licensed technology is Windows Media DRM.
Technical collaboration. Technical collaboration tends to overlap with  •	
licensing.  One  example  of  an  ongoing  collaboration  between  indus-
try partners is a deal struck between Microsoft and Nokia in February 
2005. 
Standards. In the DRM context we have seen evidence of the develop- •	
ment and implementation of various forms of market-based standards 
aimed at fostering interoperability between systems and applications. 
Among these standards is ODRL as a Rights Expression Language, dis-
cussed above. Standards in different areas have also arisen through the 
efforts of various industry groups and formal standards organizations. 
Regulatory Approaches. Governments can use different means to con- •	
tribute to an interoperable DRM ecosystem. While certain approaches 
are widely contested (e.g. mandating standards, disclosure of interoper-
ability information), others seem to be less controversial (e.g. public pro-
curement, providing frameworks for cooperation). To date, probably the 
most far-reaching legislative approach to DRM interoperability has been 
taken by France (see below), where companies can be forced to disclose 
interoperability information to competitors. 
Mapping	approaches 3.1.2 
The approaches outlined in the previous section, can be mapped along dif-
ferent dimensions. For the purpose of our study, we differentiate between 
private and public actors on the one hand and unilateral (or “dominant”) 
versus collaborative strategies on the other hand. A possible map of frequently 
discussed approaches to DRM interoperability, viewed from a policy perspec-
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Benchmarks 3.1.3 
The next section seeks to describe selected approaches to DRM interoperabil-
ity in some greater detail and to evaluate the various means by which higher 
degrees of interoperability can be achieved. Such an assessment begs the ques-
tion of relevant benchmarks. Given the research project to which this case 
study seeks to contribute, we suggest the following five criteria.
Permeability. This criterion describes the ability of a given approach to  •	
interoperability to take into account important factual (ex ante) circum-
stances that characterize the ecosystem in which it seeks to operate. Such 
characteristics are, for example, the market’s maturity, product and ser-
vice maturity, state of technological development, the features of existing 
and emerging business models, consumer needs, etc. 
Effectiveness. Different approaches to DRM interoperability are likely  •	
to result in different degrees of interoperability achieved and maintained 
over time.
Cost efficiency. As previously discussed, achieving and maintaining a  •	
certain level of interoperability comes with costs. We use the term cost 
efficiency here as an indicator of the level of costs imposed on affected 
players for a given degree of interoperability. 
“Collaborative” approaches
“Unilateral” approaches
Non-regulatory 
approaches 
(private actors)
Regulatory 
approaches 
(state actors)
unilateral design mandating standards
disclosure of information
transparency for consumers
public procurement
framework for cooperation
reverse engineering
IP licensing
technical collaboration
open standard initiatives39 c h a p t e r  t h r e e   Approaches towards DRM Music Interoperability
Flexibility. This criterion refers to the (bi-directional) interaction be- •	
tween a certain approach and ex post changes in the relevant ecosystem 
(i.e., the online music market) in general and to technological develop-
ment in particular. 
Stimulating power. We use this fifth criterion to indicate to what degree  •	
a particular approach to DRM interoperability tends to enhance com-
petition (e.g. by lowering entry barriers) and foster innovation (e.g. by 
amplifying or creating incentives). 
Most  of  the  proposed  benchmarks  would  require  a  detailed  case-by-case 
analysis if applied to one of the approaches mapped in the previous section. 
The “stimulating power” of IP licensing on potential market entrants, for 
instance, heavily depends on the terms and conditions of the license as well 
as the structure of the licensing fee (e.g. up-front investment or “per unit” 
charge). Despite this caveat, we will use the criteria in the next section to flag 
at least some initial projections with regard to potential strength and weak-
nesses of the selected approaches. 
evaluating selected approaches towards  3.2 
dRM music interoperability
Selected	approaches	by	private	actors 3.2.1 
Reverse	engineering 3.2.1.1 
In the context of DRM music interoperability, we distinguish between two 
types of reverse engineering: 
First, an approach that aims to equip a digital file with a certain DRM  •	
technology, and thus allows it to enter a closed ecosystem of products 
or  services  that  support  (only)  the  reverse-engineered  DRM  system; 
thereby, users of the reverse-engineered system are provided with an ad-
ditional source of content (“import”-strategy of reverse engineering). A 
practical example in this context is the described effort by Real Networks 
to reverse-engineer Apple’s DRM system FairPlay.71 
Second, reverse engineering can be used as a tool to establish interoper- •	
ability by facilitating the use of digital files intended to work only within 
71   See, e.g., Press release from July 26, 2004 (http://www.realnetworks.com/company/
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a closed DRM ecosystem of a third party on other devices or services 
(“export”-strategy of reverse engineering). For example, Double Twist 
Ventures, a company run by Jon Johansen, reverse-engineered Apple’s 
DRM system and announced that it intended to grant licenses that 
would allow devices other than the iPod to play iTunes content.72
As discussed above, the legality of reverse engineering to establish DRM inter-
operability – or at least certain forms of it (e.g. software-data-interoperability) 
– is uncertain under national anti-circumvention and copyright laws and usu-
ally also prohibited by the provider’s license agreements or terms of services. 
Further, the lawfulness of reverse engineering in the DRM space depends on 
the particular method that is been used; often clearly in the problem zone are 
“export”-strategies.73
Applying the normative criteria outlined above, one might tentatively assess 
reverse engineering as an approach to DRM interoperability as follows: 
Reverse engineering is a bottom-up approach to interoperability. There  •	
is a high probability that the reverse engineer, if it is a commercial entity 
(consider, e.g., Real Networks), knows about the state of technology, 
consumer needs, the product and service markets, business models, etc. 
Thus, reverse engineering is characterized, in our view, by a high degree 
of permeability. 
Depending on the factual circumstances, reverse engineering can signifi- •	
cantly improve interoperability among DRM systems. This holds true, 
for instance, if the market leader’s DRM system is successfully reverse-
engineered. However, the “Harmony” example and Apple’s response also 
demonstrate that such an approach may only work short-term, because 
the DRM provider has the possibility to update its DRM scheme con-
tinuously. In sum, reverse engineering tends to range at the lower end of 
an effectiveness scale. 
Viewed from the costs involved to achieve a higher level of DRM in- •	
teroperability,  reverse  engineering  seems  comparatively  cost-efficient. 
72   See Monique Farantzos, business partner of Jon Johansen, in an interview on 25 Oc-
tober 2006 (http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1009_22-6129476.html). Besides this export-
strategy, the company also follows the above-mentioned import strategy (ibid.).
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However, additional costs may be involved if this approach is used to 
maintain interoperability among competing platforms under the scenar-
io just described (“arm’s race”-situation). Furthermore, reverse engineers 
might face considerable legal costs under current law because reverse en-
gineering might be illegal under the applicable law.
As a bottom-up approach, reverse engineering is clearly a strategy that  •	
preserves high degrees of flexibility. It is hard to see how it would fore-
close technological development. 
Reverse engineering may be seen as an approach that enhances competi- •	
tion and innovation in several respects. First, it might level the playing 
field, thus lowering the market entry barriers for new players. Second, it 
might trigger product or service innovation on the part of the provider 
of the product or service that has been reverse engineered. Third, reverse 
engineering can itself be seen as an innovative activity, leading to new 
applications and products that will compete on the market. 
IP	Licensing 3.2.1.2 
The term IP licensing is used here in a broad sense to generically describe 
all approaches to DRM inoperability that are based on access to technol-
ogy or technical specifications, including associated IP rights such as patents, 
copyright, trademarks, and the like, that is provided consensually. Thus, IP 
licensing has many different forms and faces. Often, licensing is also part of 
approaches that, for analytical purposes, are treated under a separate heading, 
such as the unilateral design of interoperable products or even standardization 
efforts. In any event, both the terms and conditions of a licensing agreement 
and, accordingly, their impact on the level of interoperability may vary signifi-
cantly along at least three dimensions:
Scope: The licensing agreement specifies the breadth of the rights that  •	
are granted. Obviously, the scope of the license might vary consider-
ably. A license, for example, may allow a device manufacturer to develop 
products that fully support the functionalities of a DRM system. Alter-
natively, the license might only grant access to parts of the DRM system 
so that, for instance, the device manufacturer is not empowered to use 
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Compensation: Licensees often have to pay a licensing fee to access the  •	
licensor’s DRM technology. However, there are also circumstances in 
which the licensee does not have to pay a fee but to give something else 
(e.g. another license in the case of cross-licensing) in return.
Exclusivity: Licensing agreements may also differ in terms of the nature  •	
and number of contracting parties. For example, access to a given piece 
of DRM technology can be granted on an exclusive basis to one partner 
only (e.g. Motorola in the case of Apple’s FairPlay), or to multiple part-
ners (e.g. Microsoft’s partners in the PlaysForSure initiative). 
In the past few years, different types of licenses have been granted in the DRM 
music space that contributed in one way or another to DRM interoperability. 
Based on the characteristics of the licensor, one might group the examples for 
illustrative purposes as follows:
Single companies that licensed their DRM technology: Microsoft, for  •	
example, has made its Windows Media DRM available for online stores 
such as Napster, Wal-Mart and Real’s Rhapsody ToGo Service, and de-
vice manufacturers, including SanDisk. As noted, Microsoft pursued an 
open licensing strategy in order to encourage greater usage of the Win-
dows Media Player jukebox and get a multitude of users of digital enter-
tainment to “gravitate” around its software. 
Licensing agreements as part of bilateral co-operations: Important li- •	
censing deals where parties grant each other access to DRM technology 
have also taken place between companies at different levels of the value 
chain. For example, Microsoft and Nokia established a bridge between 
the Microsoft Windows Media DRM and the OMA DRM for wireless 
devices in February 2005: On the one hand, Nokia builds support into 
its music-playing phones for the Windows Media DRM, thereby allow-
ing a transfer of protected music files onto Nokia devices. On the other 
hand, the OMA DRM finds support in the Windows Media Player via 
a plug-in. This collaboration enables owners of certain Nokia phones to 
buy music in either a Windows Media DRM or OMA DRM-compliant 
store and play it on their phones, PCs and other devices supporting the 
Windows Media DRM system.
Multi-player organization licensing of DRM technology: A recent exam- •	
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manufacturers and aimed at creating a DRM system that works with de-
vices from different vendors. Its first specification, released in May 2006, 
is available to anyone who signs an evaluation agreement.74 A second 
example is the Digital Media Project (DMP), an independent standards 
initiative that started in September 2003 and has so far released two spec-
ifications.75 In the related area of mobile content, an important initiative 
aiming at DRM interoperability is the Open Mobile Alliance’s (OMA) 
DRM system (see above).
Given the many forms of IP licensing that are and may be used to contribute 
to higher levels DRM interoperability, it seems particularly difficult to make 
a general assessment of the approach’s merits and demerits. However, the fol-
lowing tentative assessment characterizes at least some of the overall promises 
and limits: 
IP licensing tends to be very context-sensitive in the sense that both the  •	
licensor and the licensee will carefully take into account the current state 
of the DRM music ecosystem, including the state of technology and 
market development, existing and emerging business models, consumer 
needs, etc. Licensing thus tends to have a great degree of permeability. 
The effectiveness of a licensing approach toward DRM interoperability  •	
depends very much on the concrete licensing agreement. As noted, the 
general licensing policy on the one hand and the particular terms and 
conditions on the other hand will ultimately determine the contribution 
of a single licensing deal to a more interoperable online music ecosystem. 
Licensing fees may play a particularly important role. And, obviously, the 
effectiveness depends on the company’s willingness to provide access in 
the first place – a feature that may limit the approach’s overall promise 
given prominent cases of players (like Apple) who refuse to license their 
DRM technology or related patents (see above).
IP licensing tends to be a cost-efficient way of increasing the level of DRM  •	
interoperability. Especially sophisticated and “streamlined” licensing pro-
cedures provided by the big players reduce transaction costs significantly. 
74  See, e.g., Bill Rosenblatt, Marlin Group Releases First Spec, May 11, 2006, http://www.
drmwatch.com/standards/article.php/3605611.
75   See, e.g., Bill Rosenblatt, Digital Media Project Releases Second Spec, May 25, 2006, 
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The administration of licenses and compliance issues might be significant, 
depending on the volume and complexity of the licensing practices, but 
probably does not lower the approach’s overall cost efficiency.  
IP licensing, generally speaking, is a market-driven and therefore flexible  •	
approach, which, in principle, does not foreclose the development and 
adaptation of future technologies. This holds particularly true in situa-
tions where non-dominant companies are contracting. In cases of multi-
party licensing and widespread adaptation of a particular proprietary 
technology (emergence of a “de facto standard”), however, the degrees of 
flexibility might decrease due to the “stickiness” of a particular technol-
ogy (switching costs) and collective action problems. 
The impact of DRM licensing on competition and innovation depends  •	
again on the particular licensing policy of the key players and the respec-
tive terms and conditions. Licensing in a competitive market environ-
ment can be expected to foster innovation and competition, as Micro-
soft’s PlaysForSure initiative illustrates. In contrast, licensing may even-
tually slow down innovation and competition in cases where a player 
with a de facto standard changes its licensing policy or uses it in an anti-
competitive manner (e.g. by refusing to license the DRM technology to 
particular players on the market place).76 
Open	Standards 3.2.1.3 
Standards are a collaborative approach towards higher levels of DRM in-
teroperability. As noted, several types of standards exist. Often, three forms 
76   In the U.S., unilateral refusal to license technology may be actionable if it entails a viola-
tion of anti-trust laws such as Section 2 of the Sherman Act which prohibits monopoliza-
tion or the attempt to monopolize.  See CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp. (In re Independent 
Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litigation), 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000). However, in the 
1999 case of Intergraph	Corp.,	v.	Intel	Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999), the Federal 
Circuit stated that “[i]n Image Technical Services the Ninth Circuit reported that it had 
found ‘no reported case in which a court had imposed antitrust liability for a unilateral re-
fusal to sell or license a patent or copyright.’ . . . . Nor have we.”  Id. at 1362.  The court 
went on to cite a 1995 document from the Department of Justice and Federal Trade 
Commission which stated that “market power does not ‘impose on the intellectual prop-
erty owner an obligation to license the use of that property to others.’” United States 
Dept. of Justice and Federal Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of 
Intellectual Property 4 (1995). For the European perspective, see Kamiel J. Koelman, An 
Exceptio Standardis: Do We Need an IP Exemption for Standards?, pp. 4-7, available at 
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are distinguished: proprietary DRM standards such as Apple’s FairPlay; de 
facto standards like, in some parts of the world, SDC (Secure Digital Con-
tainer) DRM technology; and open standards.77 While we have discussed 
proprietary standards in previous sections,78 this paragraph now focuses on 
open standards. The opinions on how to define the term “open standard” vary 
greatly.79 The ITU-T, for instance, defines open standards as follows:
“’Open Standards’ are standards made available to the general public 
and are developed (or approved) and maintained via a collaborative and 
consensus driven process. ‘Open Standards’ facilitate interoperability 
and data exchange among different products or services and are intend-
ed for widespread adoption.“80
Some definitions and characterizations require that (a) open standards are ap-
proved by formalized committees that are open to participation by all parties 
and operate on a continuous basis, and (b) are made accessible to the public 
free of charge.81 The European High Level Group on Digital Rights Manage-
ment uses the following definition:
“Open standards are prepared by open standards organizations with an 
open process, published objectives, Fair, Reasonable and Non Discrimi-
natory (FRND) based licensing terms (applicable where patented tech-
nology is incorporated in a standard).  Furthermore open standards pro-
vide publicly available technical specifications hence any implementer 
can utilise the standard.”82
Open standards have recently gained much attention in the debates about in-
77   For a more nuanced classification of standards, see: Raymond Gifford, Standards in the 
Digital Age, 2005, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=987307.
78   See also Palfrey, supra note 7, 11 et seq. with examples of DRM standardization efforts. 
79   For a good overview of the different degrees of openness, see Joel West, The economic 
realities of open standards: black, white, and the many shades of gray, in: Shane Green-
stein and Victor Stango (eds.), Standards and Public Policy, Cambridge University Press 
2007, pp. 87-122.
80   TSB Director’s Ad Hoc Group on IPR, Definition of “Open Standards,” http://www.itu.int/
ITU-T/othergroups/ipr-adhoc/openstandards.html.
81   See, e.g., European Interoperability Framework for pan-European eGovernment Ser-
vices, available at http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=19528. See also Berkman 
Center, supra note 59, p. 6 (“available royalty free or at minimal cost“).
82   High Level Group on Digital Rights Management, Final Report, March-July 2004, 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/2005/all_about/digital_rights_man/
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teroperability83, especially in the context of open document formats like Open 
XML.84 An example of an open standard in the DRM space is the above-
mentioned Open Digital Rights Language (ODRL) initiative, which seeks to 
provide an open and free standard for the semantics of DRM systems.85 This 
initiative meets even the narrow interpretation of the open standards concept. 
As noted, ODRL faces legal challenges because ContentGuard, the company 
that developed XrML, claims that ODRL infringes its patents. 
Open standards are often perceived as the preferred way to achieve DRM 
interoperability. The above-mentioned High Level Group on DRM, for in-
stance, stated in its final report that “[t]here is wide consensus that open 
standards offers [sic] the best realistic possibility for true cross-platform in-
teroperability of services and devices from multiple providers, conducive to 
achievement of true user convenience and thereby mass market acceptance of 
DRM enabled services.”86 
As  voluntary,  multi-party,  and  market-driven  initiatives,  open  DRM  •	
projects certainly take into account the current state of the DRM ecosys-
tem. Thus they can be seen as the industry’s response to the current state 
of market development, technology, business models, and (last but not 
least) customers’ needs. In that regard, open standards represent a type of 
approach to interoperability with high degrees of permeability. 
Open standards have the potential to be very powerful mechanisms for  •	
achieving high degrees of DRM interoperability among the systems and 
applications of a large field of market players. However, there are also 
limitations. First, these initiatives represent a purely voluntary effort. 
Companies that decline to join the initiative but hold a patent in the area 
83   See, e.g., Nicos L. Tsilas, Open innovation and interoperability: Putting open standards 
in perspective (manuscript, on file with authors).
84   See, e.g., Microsoft, Interoperability, Choice and Open XML, February 14, 2007, avail-
able at http://www.microsoft.com/interop/letters/choice.mspx.
85   See, e.g., Renato Iannella, Open Digital Rights Management, A Position Paper for the 
W3C DRM Workshop, available at http://www.w3.org/2000/12/drm-ws/pp/iprsystems-
iannella.html. 
86   High Level Group on Digital Rights Management, Final Report, March-July 2004, p. 7, 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/2005/all_about/digital_rights_man/
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(i.e., a submarine patent or known blocking patent) can damage or even 
destroy the open standard.87 Second, an open standards-based approach 
may come under pressure once the interoperable DRM system is broken 
and the technology moves ahead to another model.88 
Standard-setting processes are usually complex and relatively expensive.  •	
Compared to unilateral or bilateral approaches to DRM interoperability, 
open standards are likely to absorb a greater amount of resources and 
management attention and are in this regard less cost-efficient. Especially 
the negotiation and coordination efforts may be costly, depending on 
the number of collaborators and their respective incentive structures. If 
a standard is flawed, it can be a significant setback for an entire technol-
ogy area. For instance, the Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI) was 
a forum in the late 1990s including major record labels and technology 
companies that attempted to construct a “bulletproof” system to pro-
vide consumers with easy access to music while preventing piracy. When 
SDMI issued a challenge to the Internet community to attempt to break 
its encryption, a team led by Ed Felten at Princeton demonstrated that 
the entire premise of SDMI’s technology was faulty. Since then, DRM 
technologies in music have developed almost exclusively on the “unilat-
eral” model and not through any consensus in the industry. If SDMI had 
succeeded, the DRM sector would undoubtedly be more interoperable 
than it is today. Given that it failed, though, nobody has built sufficient 
momentum to develop any new standard-setting process.
Open standards may provide a lesser degree of flexibility with regard to  •	
technological change than other approaches. Standard setting is a time-
consuming process. Even if this process is open and transparent, a stan-
dard is by definition a snapshot of the state of the art at a particular point 
in time and may even “freeze” a particular state of technology for a pe-
riod of time.89 Further, it is likely that open standards, like other highly 
87   See, e.g., the Forgent/JPEG controversy, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JPEG#Potential_
patent_issues or the ODRL/ContentGuard controversy mentioned above. 
88   Palfrey, supra note 7, p. 15. 
89   See generally Timothy Simcoe, Delay and de jure standardization: exploring the slow-
down in Internet standards development, in: Shane Greenstein and Victor Stango (eds.), 
Standards and Public Policy, Cambridge University Press 2007, pp. 260-291.c a s e s t u d y   DRM-protected Music Interoperability and eInnovation 48
collaborative approaches to DRM interoperability, create some sort of 
“stickiness” the greater their acceptance among the stakeholders.90 
By providing access to the technology, its specifications, and the associ- •	
ated rights on the basis of a reasonable and non-discriminatory license 
(RAND) – with or without monetary compensation – open standards 
tend to reduce market barriers for new entrants and foster the develop-
ment of new, interoperable products and services which, in turn, will sat-
isfy consumers and lead to market growth. However, it should be also not-
ed that standards consortiums may in certain constellations manipulate 
the standard-setting process in order to achieve anticompetitive ends.91
Selected	regulation-based	approaches 3.2.2 
Mandating	Standards 3.2.2.1 
Another possible approach is that governmental authorities mandate the adop-
tion of an interoperable standard on the part of industry players. Notably, this 
approach could take different forms. On the one hand, a government could 
unilaterally determine the standard, perhaps following an internal review and 
assessment of existing standards. On the other hand, government could mere-
ly set a timetable for the establishment and implementation of a common 
standard, but leave it to industry players to determine what that standard 
should be. Between these two poles, all manner of hybrid approaches are pos-
sible, where government enters into a dialogue with industry players. In such 
scenarios, government would be an active participant in the determination of 
the standard, but would also facilitate the input of industry players.
Here, we present two examples where governments have selected a standard 
to be adopted by industry:
In the United States, the Federal Communications Commission decided  •	
to largely adopt standards developed by the Advanced Television Systems 
90   See,	e.g., Kamiel J. Koelman, supra note 76, p. 16 for a discussion of this issue.
91   For a case study, see Jeffrey K. MacKie and Janet S. Netz, Manipulating interface 
standards as an anticompetitive strategy, in: Shane Greenstein and Victor Stango (eds.), 
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Committee for implementation in digital television.92 These standards 
incorporated the eight level vestigial side band (8-VSB) method for tel-
evision modulation.93 The adoption of this modulation method was the 
result of studies conducted by a special advisory group formed within the 
FCC.94 These studies, however, were “supported by the work of hundreds 
of industry technical experts.”95  Following the formal adoption of the 
modulation method, the FCC received requests from private industry 
players to allow alternative methods.96 The FCC rejected these propos-
als, largely based on a study conducted by a group of private broadcast-
ers that the Commission took as an indication that the industry widely 
preferred not to add the proposed alternative.97
In the United Kingdom, the Crown government recognized that the  •	
realization of its e-Government initiatives would require the interoper-
ability of various government programs. The e-Government Unit of the 
Cabinet Office therefore developed an e-Government Interoperability 
Framework (e-GIF), which “sets out the government’s technical policies 
and specifications for achieving interoperability and Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) systems coherence across the public 
sector.”98 In developing technical standards for interoperability, however, 
the e-Government Unit largely adopted prevailing, common Internet 
92  Technical Research Branch, Laboratory Division, Office of Engineering and Technology, 
Federal Communications Commission, A STUDY OF ATSC (8-VSB) DTV COVERAGE IN 
WASHINGTON, DC, AND GENERATIONAL CHANGES IN DTV RECEIVER PERFORM-
ANCE (April 9, 2001), p. 2-3, available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Engineering_Tech-
nology/Reports/oetrpt4901.pdf.
93   Id., p. 3.
94   See	id.
95   Id.
96   See REPORT AND ORDER AND FURTHER NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULE MAKING, In 
the Matter of Review of the Commission’s Rules and Policies Affecting the Conversion To 
Digital Television, MM Docket No. 00-39, FCC-01-24 (January 19, 2001), p. 32, available 
at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Mass_Media/Orders/2001/fcc01024.pdf.
97   Id., p. 32-34.
98   U.K. Cabinet Office, e-Government Unit, e-Government Interoperability Framework Ver-
sion 6.1 (18 March 2005), p. 5 (citation omitted), available at http://www.govtalk.gov.uk/
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and World Wide Web standards.99 They also chose to adopt XML and 
XSL for data integration and management and developed an open dis-
cussion forum between the public sector and industry for the discursive 
development of common XML schemas for use in the public sector.100 
In this manner, the e-Government unit aimed to combine standards that 
were widely accepted in the marketplace with the ongoing development 
of implementation strategies supported by industry input.101
A government mandated approach is generally the least popular among indus-
try players. Notably, neither example represents a wholly top-down approach 
to the development of standards on the part of government. This is most 
likely due to perceived drawbacks in permitting government to establish stan-
dards for the industry, as well as a desire to facilitate democratic processes. 
There is a perception that governments are ill-equipped to determine  •	
on their own what existing or potential standards represent the best op-
tion.102 Additionally, critics fear that government selection of standards 
too easily falls prey to the influence of private interests.103 However, the 
government could mandate a standard that is developed by market par-
ticipants, thus reinforcing a consensus and achieving significant permea-
bility. To the extent that government attempts to independently develop 
or assess a standard, a government-mandated approach may not hold 
much promise of achieving permeability.
 On the other hand, government mandated interoperability can establish  •	
an interoperable solution where market forces do not prompt industry 
players to do so. As opposed to reverse engineering, the government 
mandated approach would establish a single standard for all industry 
players across the board as soon as a standard is adopted. Therefore, the 
effectiveness of this approach is particularly high. Where the government 
attempts to assess the best solution on its own, however, the process of 
99   Id.
100   Id.
101   See	id.
102   Raymond Gifford, Standards in the Digital Age, p. 7 (2005), http://www.pff.org/issues-
pubs/pops/pop12.2europestandards.pdf.
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implementation is likely to be notably slower than an approach which 
relies on industry to find the interoperable standard. 
Yet, the traditional government-mandated approach would not present  •	
any flexibility, since the government is not the best party to gauge market 
requirements and cannot adapt to changes in market conditions in an ef-
ficient manner. However, a recursive approach such as that taken by the 
UK government does offer notable flexibility.
As for cost efficiency, a government-mandated approach is likely to per- •	
form poorly, since it will rely on government enforcement to ensure the 
standard is adhered to.
The effects of a government-mandated DRM interoperability standard  •	
on competition and innovation remain uncertain. While a common 
standard may positively affect certain forms of competition within the 
online music market by leveling the playing field, it is likely to set nega-
tive incentives for the further development of proprietary technologies 
that, under a market-based scenario, may have the promise either to be 
widely licensed or become a de facto standard.
Disclosure	of	interoperability	information	 3.2.2.2 
Another approach for achieving higher levels of DRM interoperability by 
regulatory means is to mandate the disclosure of information that is essen-
tial to build interoperable systems and applications. This approach has been 
taken by the French legislature, which made significant modifications to the 
French IP Code in August 2006.104 According to the current law (as amend-
ed), DRM schemes are not allowed to prevent effective interoperability. The 
IP code does not provide a definition of the term interoperability, but leaves 
it to a newly created regulatory authority for technical measures “to ensure 
that DRMs, ‘because of lack of interoperability, do not create, in the use of 
a work, additional and independent limitations to those expressly chosen by 
the right-holder.’”105 According to French law, software publishers, manufac-
turers of technical systems, and service providers can contact the regulatory 
104   For an overview, see, e.g., Nicolas Jondet, La France v. Apple: who’s the dadvsi in 
DRMs?, in SCRIPT-ed, Vol. 3 Issue 4 June 2006, available at http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/
ahrc/script-ed/vol3-4/jondet.asp. 
105   Nicolas Jondet, DRM watchdog established in France, April 2007, available at http://
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body in cases where the DRM supplier refuses to give access to interoperabil-
ity information. The authority has to decide within two months whether the 
demand is to be rejected or the disclosure of the interoperability information 
is to be compelled through an injunction. The authority determines the scope 
and time-frame in which access has to be provided, and also sets the financial 
compensation that has to be paid to the disclosing party in return. It may 
also impose a severe financial penalty in the case of non-compliance with the 
injunction.
Mandatory disclosure of DRM interoperability information, as noted, is a 
recent phenomenon. Accordingly, there is very little experience with its prac-
tical implementation. However, based on the benchmarks we might make 
some reasonable hypotheses concerning the approach’s pros and cons.
It is unclear to what extent the permeability criterion, in this model,  •	
plays a role. Conceptually, one might imagine a scenario in which the 
administrative authority would take into account the market, product 
and service maturity as well as the state of technological development, 
business models, etc. when determining whether or not a DRM provider 
has to disclose interoperability information. Under French law, however, 
the language of the law itself does not indicate that such factors need to 
be considered. 
Arguably, the approach’s effectiveness largely depends on the particular  •	
design of the relevant disclosure rules. Generally speaking, the impact on 
the interoperability level should not be overestimated, because the dis-
closure is limited in scope and concerns two parties only. In the French 
example, the effect is further limited by the fact that only technology 
companies may request the disclosure of interoperability information. 
As with other regulation-based approaches, mandated disclosure of in- •	
formation – depending on the design of the particular regulatory regime 
– may be associated with significant administrative costs. The creation 
and operation of a specialized administrative authority like in France 
is illustrative in this respect. Despite the lack of any data about the ex-
act administrative costs, it remains uncertain whether this approach to 
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Disclosure of interoperability information is unlikely to run the risk  •	
of creating any kind of lock-in or preventing the adoption of more ad-
vanced DRM technologies. 
It is currently highly contested whether the approach taken by the French  •	
parliament will ultimately strengthen competition and foster innovation. 
On the one hand, the approach prevents competitors from leveraging a 
refusal to license in an anti-competitive way, thereby enabling the cre-
ation of new and interoperable products and services in situations where 
licenses would otherwise not be granted.  On the other hand, such a legal 
regime may disincentivize up-front investments in new DRM technolo-
gies in the first place, especially if the administrative authority would set 
compensation rates at relatively low amounts.  
Transparency	rules,	labeling	requirements 3.2.2.3 
Traditional economics suggests that the DRM-protected music market works 
well when the different parties to the various transactions (e.g. purchase of 
a song on iTunes, or buying a Zune player) are informed of the price and 
qualities of the commodity or service they are contracting for.106 In the case 
of DRM, the characteristics of the commodities being traded cannot easily 
be assessed through inspection. Typically, they fully reveal their qualities (e.g. 
levels of interoperability among various devices and services) only upon use. 
For this type of experience good, a problem arises when the provider is better 
informed than its contracting partner and can take advantage of this informa-
tional asymmetry. One traditional strategy for dealing with this problem is to 
mandate the disclosure of information about the product or service quality.   
For instance, after Sony BMG DRM practices were publicized, United States 
regulators entered into consent decrees with Sony BMG mandating that it 
label copy-protected CDs to show what was and was not permitted, among 
other things.107 In the DRM space, consumer protection authorities, as noted 
before, have argued that providers of digital music should indicate whether 
106   See, e.g., Ejan Maccay, The Law and Economics of Information Quality, in: Gasser (ed.), 
Information Quality Regulation: Foundations, Perspectives, and Applications (2004)., 
107   See Federal Trade Commission, Sony BMG Settles FTC Charges, January 30, 2007, 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/01/sony.shtm; Office of the New York State Attorney Gen-
eral, New York Joins Nationwide Settlement with Sony BMG over Hidden Files, Press 
Release, December 21, 2006, http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2006/dec/dec21d_06.
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the content is protected by a DRM system, what usage restrictions apply, 
and on what devices the work cannot be played.108 A more comprehensive 
transparency regime aimed at improving market efficiency would oblige all 
vendors of digital music not only to list usage restrictions, but also to pro-
vide a logo of the DRM software they apply (labeling). In addition, device 
manufacturers would be required to label their devices with the logos of the 
DRM software they support. Thus, for instance, Apple would have to design 
a logo for its FairPlay DRM and feature the logo on the iTunes Store as well 
as on iPod boxes, or to put it on the back of the devices. Consumer advocates 
maintain that consumers would then be better positioned to express their 
interoperability preferences by “voting with their wallets.”
What are the promises and limitations of such a relatively indirect approach 
according to the previously defined benchmarks?
The permeability criterion is not a feasible one to assess this particular  •	
approach. It may play a certain role in that legislators or regulators would 
consider the market developments, state of technology, etc. before man-
dating the disclosure of information about the interoperability quality of 
the respective platforms and devices. 
The approach’s effectiveness is very difficult to determine.  As noted, la- •	
beling requirements and the like would contribute to increased levels 
of DRM interoperability in indirect ways. They would almost certainly 
make consumers more knowledgeable, enabling them to express their 
preferences about DRM and interoperability through purchasing deci-
sions. Much would depend on the actual design of the labeling provi-
sions (inherent threat of information overload). In any event, informa-
tion about the varying degrees of interoperation across platforms and 
devices would most likely support the emergence of a market for DRM 
interoperability. 
Information disclosure, including labeling, is obviously associated with  •	
costs, particularly monitoring and enforcement costs. In any event, an 
information-based approach to interoperability is likely to be more cost 
efficient than the regulatory approaches sketched before.
108   See the case of EMI’s copy protection of CD’s in France. 55 c h a p t e r  t h r e e   Approaches towards DRM Music Interoperability
There are no signs that labels and other forms of product and service in- •	
teroperability information would be conflict with the development and 
adaptation of new DRM technologies in the future. 
To the extent that labeling would reduce existing information asymme- •	
tries among market participants, it would clearly enhance the function-
ing of the online music market. The approach would also increase users’ 
trust in online stores and digital distribution of content more generally. 
This, in turn, may result in market growth, which attracts new competi-
tors providing innovative products and services. 
Conclusion 3.2.3 
While any benchmarking of different approaches towards DRM interoper-
ability would need a detailed and case-specific investigation, the preceding 
evaluation may serve at least to flag some trends with regard to potential 
benefits and drawbacks of the different approaches examined. Within the 
portrayed private actor-driven approaches, IP licensing of DRM technology 
appears as a necessary, but likely not sufficient condition to achieve a high 
degree of interoperability. If combined with other approaches such as open 
standards, however, licensing appears to become a crucial element in the mix 
– also (but not only) due to its positive overall impact on competition and 
innovation (leaving potential anti-competitive behavior aside). As far as reg-
ulation-based approaches are concerned, we caution both against the use of 
a government-mandated standards approach as well as mandatory DRM in-
formation disclosure requirements imposed by legislation. While the discus-
sion of the particular merits and demerits of both approaches depend on the 
envisioned implementation of the respective approach, it seems appropriate 
to conclude that especially a mandatory standards approach performs poorly 
under several of the proposed evaluation criteria. However, we also conclude 
that the government can (and actually does) play an important role in the 
DRM-protected music interoperability ecosystem in that it adjusts existing 
legal frameworks to create incentives for market players to achieve higher 
levels of interoperability. Such strategies include labeling requirements aimed 
at reducing information asymmetries between DRM providers and consum-
ers, the explicit permission of reverse-engineering in copyright and anti-cir-
cumvention legislation, and governmental promotion of the development of 
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Based on the merits and demerits of the six approaches, we conclude that 
probably the most promising strategy towards higher and sustainable de-
grees of DRM interoperability would consist of a blended approach where 
private-sector efforts would interplay with supplementing, regulation-based 
approaches (e.g., reverse-engineering exceptions and transparency require-
ments, among others). In this respect, further research might explore how 
the different approaches could work together and compensate their respective 
weaknesses while amplifying the respective strengths57 c h a p t e r  t h r e e   Approaches towards DRM Music Interoperabilityc a s e s t u d y   DRM-protected Music Interoperability and eInnovation 58
suMMARy
In this case study, aimed at exploring the current state and possible future  1. 
of DRM-protected music interoperability and its interplay with competition 
and innovation, we developed a holistic, non-technical definition of DRM 
interoperability by circumscribing it as the perceived notion of the proper 
functioning of the relevant elements of two or more entities that facilitate ac-
cess to and use of digital content. At the core of the definition is the relative 
ability of different systems, applications or components – usually provided by 
multiple vendors – to work together in a manner that is satisfactory to the 
relevant users of the system, application, or component. 
Understanding DRM interoperability as a continuum along a spectrum,  2. 
interoperability, according to the proposed working definition, would mean 
different things to different stakeholders, for example:
DRM interoperability from the user’s perspective means that she can  •	
flexibly choose among different services that offer DRM-protected con-
tent, which in turn can be used with different applications or on different 
devices. 
From the angle of a content provider, DRM interoperability means that  •	
content and rights can be “cleared” once and distributed over the most 
efficient distribution channel, without being locked-in to a gatekeeper-
like distribution channel.
459 c h a p t e r  f o u r   summary
From the content distributor›s perspective, DRM interoperability en- •	
sures that its technology choice does not affect the utility of its service to 
users, as the delivered content might be played by any application and 
device. 
Interoperability for the vendor means that her products work with dif- •	
ferent services, or (more generally) that one system’s component can be 
replaced by a component from another vendor. 
DRM interoperability issues have emerged both in the context of the of- 3. 
fline and online distribution of music. In the case of DRM-protected online 
music, many observers – including lawmakers and agencies – have diagnosed 
relatively low degrees of interoperability. Several major players in the online 
music space have decided to keep their DRM ecosystems and platforms 
closed, including Apple (iTunes) and Microsoft in the case of Zune/Zune 
Marketplace. At the same time, however, alternative developments have taken 
place most recently. First, online music services have emerged that allow per-
manent music downloads in an unprotected format. Second, EMI recently 
announced that it would license its music catalog DRM-free and at higher 
sound quality to various online music stores.
Digital music distribution is a complex system. Thus, several factors  4. 
shape the state of play of DRM music interoperability. Among them is tech-
nological complexity, reflected in various technical approaches that have been 
proposed to achieve interoperability (including, for instance, process and 
architecture-oriented approaches). As a case in point, we used the example of 
rights expression language, including RELs and initiatives, respectively, like 
XrML, ODRL, or Coral, to illustrate that complexity. Further, we identi-
fied the dynamic incentive structures of important stakeholders as another 
important factor that shapes the DRM interoperability ecosystem. Using the 
Apple’s iTunes as a case study and tracking the licensing policy of Microsoft 
in the DRM music space, we concluded that DRM interoperability strategies 
might not only vary within one (relatively homogenous) group of stakehold-
ers, but that there are also situations in which key players change their (liberal) 
interoperability strategy despite consumer demands to the contrary. We dis-
cussed the bi-directional role of law as another important factor in the DRM 
interoperability environment. Software patents and anti-circumvention leg-
islation might be constraints on interoperability, while competition law and 
consumer protection laws may enable an increased level of interoperability.  c a s e s t u d y   DRM-protected Music Interoperability and eInnovation 60
In this case study, we also outlined some of the merits and demerits gen- 5. 
erally associated with high levels of DRM interoperability, paying particular 
attention to its impact on innovation and competition in e-environments. 
Conventional economic analysis suggested a “non liquet” from the two per-
spectives just mentioned. Lacking empirical evidence and facing manifold 
interrelations among market structure, intellectual property rights, and the 
expectations of different stakeholders, we concluded that there is need for a 
case-by-case economic analysis of the particular DRM interoperability issues 
up for discussion – probably analogous to the sort used in competition law 
cases. However, we have also argued that normative arguments tip the balance 
towards interoperability as a general policy goal. We considered autonomy, 
access, diversity, and openness to be democratic values worth supporting. In 
contrast, our discussion of the potential drawbacks of increased levels of DRM 
interoperability, as suggested by some market players, led to the conclusion 
that the possible downsides – including security threats, privacy concerns and 
accessibility issues – do not outweigh the benefits of a highly interoperable 
DRM ecosystem. 
The paper further outlined and mapped several approaches that can be  6. 
used in practice to aim for a higher degree of DRM interoperability. Acknowl-
edging that other approaches exist, we listed approaches such as unilateral 
design, reverse engineering, IP licensing, technical collaboration, standards, 
and regulatory approaches. We then characterized and evaluated three private 
actor-driven approaches (reverse engineering, IP licensing, and open standard 
initiatives) and three regulation-based strategies (mandating standards, disclo-
sure of interoperability information, transparency for consumers) in greater 
detail. Acknowledging that any benchmarking would entail a detailed case-
by-case analysis, we identified some «trends» with regard to potential strength 
and weaknesses of the selected approaches by use of five evaluation criteria 
(permeability, effectiveness, cost efficiency, flexibility, and stimulating power 
with regard to competition and innovation). We concluded that a blended 
approach where private-sector initiatives would interplay with supplement-
ing, regulation-based approaches is likely to constitute the most promising 
strategy towards higher and sustainable degrees of DRM interoperability. 61 c h a p t e r  f o u r   summary